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ABSTRACT 
 The strategic ambiguity inherent in the United States’ One-China policy toward 
China and Taiwan is largely derived from three joint communiques, the Taiwan Relations 
Act, President Ronald Reagan’s Six Assurances, and subsequent presidential statements. 
The geostrategic environment has changed substantially in the intervening period, with 
the rise of China and its aggressive behavior leading to a more adversarial U.S.-China 
relationship and a new era of great power competition. In this new environment, this 
thesis asks: Is the United States’ One-China policy still the best approach to China and 
Taiwan? After defining the components of the United States’ One-China policy, this 
thesis analyzes the three primary policy options: 1) abandon commitments to Taiwan; 2) 
double-down on the commitments to Taiwan; and 3) maintain the status quo. Through 
systematic analysis, this thesis draws three primary conclusions. First, the relative 
economic and military power dominance of the United States, coupled with the 
importance of credibility to regional alliances, render an abandonment of commitments to 
be unjustified and dangerous. Second, doubling-down on commitments is unnecessarily 
provocative to a core interest of China, especially considering the formidable defense 
already possessed by Taiwan. Finally, maintaining the status quo through a careful 
adherence of the One-China policy remains the best policy option for the United States. 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION AND MAIN FINDINGS 
The United States’ One-China policy and strategic ambiguity toward the relations 
between Taiwan and the People’s Republic of China is largely derived from the United 
States and China Joint Communiques (1972, 1978, and 1982), the Taiwan Relations Act 
(1979), President Reagan’s Six Assurances to Taiwan, and various subsequent presidential 
statements. The ambiguous nature of the policy in many ways comes down to which words 
or passages to emphasize, differing interpretations, and through various presidential policy 
statements in the years since Richard Nixon embarked toward rapprochement with China. 
The ambiguity in the One-China policy serves to deter China from mounting an attack to 
overtake Taiwan, while also deterring Taiwan from taking actions to declare or move 
towards independence, which may provoke war. In similar fashion, the opposition to a 
formal declaration of independence by Taiwan has a reassuring effect to Beijing, while 
President Ronald Reagan’s six assurances demonstrate a commitment to Taiwan.  
Much has changed in the geostrategic environment since the original formulation 
of the One-China Policy, most prominently the rise of China in nearly every imaginable 
metric of comparison. United States presidential administration interpretations of the One-
China policy have had a tendency to shift with each subsequent presidency, thereby 
presidential policy statements have often come to serve as the de facto stance of the residing 
presidential administration. In light of the return to great power competition, the Trump 
administration has sought to deepen commitments to Taiwan through the authorization of 
additional arms sales,1 the passage of the Taiwan Travel Act,2 the passage of the Taiwan 
                                                 
1 Mohammad Zorgham, Mike Stone, and Patricia Zengerle, “U.S. State Department Approves Possible 
$2.2 Billion Arms Sale to Taiwan,” Reuters, July 9, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-taiwan-
idUSKCN1U32HT. 




Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI) Act,3 and much 
higher level of diplomatic exchange between the United States and Taiwan.4 United States 
Congressional efforts are seemingly unanimously aligned in support of the Taiwan 
Relations Act, as noted in the recent non-binding resolution reaffirming commitments 
toward Taiwan and voicing support of the revamped Taiwan Assurances Act of 2019.5 
China experts, international relations scholars, and policy experts lack consensus, and 
instead offer a range of policy options including an abandonment of commitments toward 
Taiwan, doubling down on Taiwan armament efforts, maintaining the status quo, and 
everything in between.  
The main research question of this thesis seeks to analyze whether the rise of China 
requires a different policy option than a maintenance of the status quo. Most specifically, 
given the rise of China during the recent forty years and extreme change to the strategic 
landscape, do the United States’ One-China and strategic ambiguity policies remain the 
best policy approach to China and Taiwan? Or, is John Bolton correct that “it is high time 
to revisit the ‘One-China policy’ and decide what America thinks it means, 45 years after 
the Shanghai Communique?”6 If so, do the major changes in the strategic environment 
necessitate a fourth communique that unambiguously defines U.S. policy/intentions with 
regards to Taiwan? 
After defining the components of the United States’ One-China policy, this thesis 
analyzes the three primary policy options, including an abandonment of the United States’ 
commitments to Taiwan, a doubling-down of the United States’ commitments to Taiwan, 
                                                 
3 Cory Gardner, “S.1678 - 116th Congress (2019-2020): Taiwan Allies International Protection and 
Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI) Act of 2019,” Congress.gov, March 26, 2020, https://www.congress.gov/
bill/116th-congress/senate-bill/1678. 
4 Nick Aspinwall, “High-Level U.S. Visits to Taiwan Mark 40 Years of Unofficial Ties,” The Diplomat, 
April 13, 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/04/high-level-us-visits-to-taiwan-mark-40-years-of-
unofficial-ties/. 
5 Patricia Zengerle, “U.S. House Passes pro-Taiwan Bills, Amid Trade Tensions with China,” Reuters, 
May 8, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-china-taiwan-congress-idUSKCN1SE00T. 
6 John Bolton, “Revisit the ‘One-China Policy,’” Wall Street Journal, January 17, 2017, sec. Opinion, 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/revisit-the-one-china-policy-1484611627. 
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and a maintenance of the status quo. Through identifying and analyzing the key 
implementation steps, advantages, disadvantages, and necessity of each of the primary 
policy options, this thesis provides an analytical framework that enables a relative 
comparison. Through comparison, this thesis has drawn three primary findings. First, an 
abandonment of the United States’ commitments to Taiwan is unnecessary because the 
relative economic and military power parity gap remains significantly wider than often 
portrayed with great power competition rhetoric. Furthermore, besides betraying the people 
of Taiwan, an abandonment strategy would catastrophically alienate regional allies, 
thereby decreasing security throughout East Asia. Second, doubling-down on the United 
States’ commitments toward Taiwan should not be adopted because Taiwan already 
maintains a formidable ability to defend itself against aggressive military force by China, 
a defensive capability that becomes intensely magnified when also considering the 
favorable geography of Taiwan relative to power projection from the sea. Furthermore, 
each of the implementation steps would be extremely provocative and maddening to China. 
Third, maintenance of the status quo remains the best policy option to serve the national 
interest of the United States, and more specifically is the policy option that is most likely 
to maintain the relative peace in East Asia. Despite the appearance of indecisiveness, a 
decision by the United States to adhere by its One-China policy and the requisite strategic 
ambiguity is rather a deliberate and decisive attempt to promote and maintain the relative 
peace that has persisted amongst the United States, China, and Taiwan. Though the status 
quo is far from satisfying for the United States, China, and Taiwan, the shared distribution 
of dissatisfaction has had, and will continue to have the greatest potential for stability 
across the Taiwan Strait. Put simply, any alternative is impossibly dangerous. 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH QUESTION 
The China of the Nixon/Kissinger era is quite different from the China that has 
risen in the modern day. At the time of rapprochement, China was backward and in political 
and social turmoil, still reeling from the failed policies of the Cultural Revolution. China 
ranked among the very bottom in just about every measure of effectiveness and lacked 
international legitimacy regarding the governance of China. Since the rapprochement, 
China has undergone reform leading to the largest economic expansion in world history, 
4 
and now ranks nearly on par with the United States in terms of global domestic product. 
The immense growth in the Chinese economy has facilitated the fielding of a military 
capability that is now comparable to that of the United States. Finally, China has shored up 
nearly all international legitimacy minus a small inconsequential few that continue to 
recognize Taiwan. As such, the question begs whether the changing circumstances of the 
modern day rise of China and return to great power competition warrants the same One-
China and strategic ambiguity policies as those that defined the previous nearly half 
century.  
As Alan Romberg states in his chronicle of the relations between the United States 
and China beginning in 1972, the topic of Taiwan has dominated the dialogue and resulting 
understandings between the United States and China.7 Chinese pressing of the Taiwan 
issue, then and now, is a result of its view that the issue of Taiwan is an internal affair, and 
as such, international interference would be a violation of Chinese sovereignty. This view 
was most recently reaffirmed by Xi Jinping in a speech on 1 January 2019, where he 
warned Taiwan that unification is the goal and that “we make no promise to abandon the 
use of force, and retain the option of taking all necessary measures.”8 This view has 
remained largely consistent within the Chinese Communist Party leadership throughout the 
time since rapprochement.  
Chinese emphasis toward the sensitivity and importance of Taiwan has led some 
scholars to conclude that the misunderstandings and resulting actions regarding Taiwan 
could easily lead to an escalation, up to and including nuclear conflict between the United 
States and China.9 Furthermore, a simple look at the map, combined with historical conflict 
                                                 
7 Alan D. Romberg, Rein in at the Brink of the Precipice: American Policy Toward Taiwan and US-
PRC Relations (Washington, DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center, 2003). 
8 Chris Buckley and Chris Horton, “Xi Jinping Warns Taiwan That Unification Is the Goal and Force Is 
an Option,” The New York Times, January 1, 2019, sec. World, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/01/world/
asia/xi-jinping-taiwan-china.html. 
9 Charles Glaser, “Will China’s Rise Lead to War?,” Foreign Affairs 90, no. 2 (April 2011): 87.  See 
also “PBS Frontline Interview with David Lampton,” October 18, 2001, https://pbs.org/wgbh/pages/
frontline/shows/china/interviews/lampton.html and Graham Allison’s Destined for War: Can America and 
China Escape Thucydides’s Trap?, 172–175.  
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and ongoing regional consternation among East Asian countries, a crisis on the Taiwan 
Straits represents a potential flashpoint that could quickly spiral, drawing in regional 
powers and leading to the onset of World War III. Understanding the emphasis that China 
has towards the issue of Taiwan and the flashpoint that it represents, the United States’ 
policies in this regard have direct implications toward continued world peace. As such, a 
thorough and thoughtful examination of the current policy towards China as it currently 
stands, as well as whether it should undergo change, could point toward options that 
decrease the possibility of war.  
Taiwan serves as an excellent empirical example of a transition from authoritarian 
to democratic rule. Since implementing democratic reform and disestablishing martial law 
a little more than thirty years ago, Taiwan has proven that it can peacefully transition its 
presidency between the Kuomintang and the Democratic Progressive Party. Demonstration 
of this peaceful transition reflects the will of the people in Taiwan, while also serving as a 
premier democratic example within the region. Forceful unification of the wayward 
province by the Chinese government goes against the very grain of the democratic values 
that the United States stakes claim to represent. As former President Bill Clinton alluded 
in a March 2000 speech regarding the future status of Taiwan, “the issues between Beijing 
and Taiwan must be resolved peacefully and with the assent of the people of Taiwan.”10 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW  
As briefly alluded to above, China experts, international relations scholars, and 
policy experts vary intensely in their interpretations of the One-China policy, as well as 
their recommended policy prescriptions. The first section of this literature review will 
attempt to characterize the One-China and strategic ambiguity policies. The second section 
will be a review of the five primary policy options that comprise the current scholarship.  
                                                 
10 Bill Clinton, “Full Text of Clinton’s Speech on China Trade Bill,” New York Times, March 9, 2000, 
https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/library/world/asia/030900clinton-china-text.html. 
6 
1. Defining the One-China Policy and Strategic Ambiguity  
Richard Bush states in his “A One-China Policy Primer” that “today, the U.S. One-
China policy is a distillation from key documents such as the three U.S.-Chinese joint 
communiques and the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), and a series of policy statements made 
over the years, such as the ‘six assurances.’”11 In Tangled Titans, Shelley Rigger says that 
“strategic ambiguity does not endorse unification or independence.”12 She further states 
“the policy is ambiguous in that Washington has made no firm commitment as to whether 
and under what circumstances it would defend Taiwan in the event that the peaceful process 
breaks down. Its proponents maintain that ambiguity serves the goal of dual deterrence: it 
deters China from attacking Taiwan, and it deters Taipei from provoking Beijing.”13 
Rigger also states that “the United States has never taken a position as to how the cross-
strait relationship ultimately should be resolved. Instead, it holds that any outcome is 
acceptable, so long as the two sides arrive at it through a peaceful, mutual, and noncoercive 
process. Washington has made clear that Beijing should not bully Taiwan and Taiwan 
should not provoke or insult the PRC.”14 In other words, the ambiguity inherent in the 
One-China policy serves to deter China from mounting an attack to overtake Taiwan, while 
also deterring Taiwan from unilaterally attempting to change the status quo by way of 
provocative declarations, such as a formal declaration of independence. 
An examination of the scholarship also presents a wide variety of disparate thought 
in navigating the relations among the USA, China, and Taiwan. The primary point of 
dispute among the existing scholarship can be very broadly framed as one of the following 
three: support for the status quo, calls for abandonment of commitments toward Taiwan, 
or calls to reinforce the deterrent provided by a credibly armed Taiwan. Upon further 
                                                 
11 Richard C. Bush, A One-China Policy Primer (Washington, DC: Brookings, 2017), 
https://www.brookings.edu/research/a-one-china-policy-primer/. 
12 Shelley Rigger, Tangled Titans: The United States and China, ed. David L. Shambaugh (Lanham, 
Md: Rowman & Littlefield, 2013), 304–5. 
13 Rigger, 305. 
14 Shelley Rigger, Why Giving up Taiwan Will Not Help Us with China (Washington, DC: American 
Enterprise Institute, 2011), 6, http://www.aei.org/publication/why-giving-up-taiwan-will-not-help-us-with-
china/. 
7 
review, one quickly finds that this broad framing only somewhat unpacks the complexity 
and purposeful ambiguousness contained within the One-China policy.  
2. The Five Primary Policy Options 
This section will review each of the five primary policy options. First, the United 
States should abandon its commitments toward Taiwan, in essence, accommodating China. 
Second, the United States should confront China through a doubling-down on efforts to 
arm Taiwan. Third, the shifting balance of power arrangements have negative implications 
to the United States’ ability to maintain the One-China policy. Fourth, the United States 
shall strive to maintain the status quo. Fifth, the United States should strive to designate 
Taiwan’s neutrality, or “Finlandization,” a liberalism-based approach striving for 
cooperation between the United States and China. This thesis will draw upon these five 
primary policy options to generate the hypotheses that the rest of the thesis will examine. 
a. Great Power Competition, Abandon Commitments to Taiwan 
(Accommodate China) 
The first primary policy option seeks the accommodation of a rising China, by way 
of the United States backing away from its commitments toward Taiwan. In a speech given 
to the China Maritime Studies Institute in 2011, Chas Freeman presents his argument for 
abandonment of the “intellectual shackles imposed by longstanding policy and address the 
imperatives of long-term strategic interests.”15 This recommendation calls for a 
reprioritization of the relationship between the United States and China, claiming that the 
One-China policy is incompatible with “the kind of long-term relationship of friendship 
and cooperation China and America want with each other.” In fact, Freeman suggests that 
“the Taiwan issue is the only one with the potential to ignite a war between China and the 
United States.”16 In other words, the key impediment to improving relations between the 
                                                 
15 Chas Freeman, “Beijing, Washington, and the Shifting Balance of Prestige: Remarks to the China 





United States and China is their respective policies toward Taiwan.17 To build this 
argument, Freeman leans on the 2008 financial crisis and continual federal deficits to 
describe the financial insolvency of a plan to maintain a military parity with China in the 
future. He further posits that the military competition between the United States and China 
is “all the more disadvantageous because China is competing in notably cost-effective 
ways, and we are not.”18 In short, Freeman’s argument could be distilled to one that 
recognizes the hegemonic shifting tailwinds pointing toward a rising China relative to the 
dwindling power and prestige of the United States. The structural pressures of the current 
international system are intense, and if not carefully managed, could lead to catastrophic 
conflict between great powers. To this, Freeman aligns with Robert Gilpin’s conflict 
avoidance prescription as a means of reducing commitments through retrenchment;19 or in 
specific terms, this policy option calls for the abandonment of U.S. commitments to Taiwan 
because the United States and China are entering a strategic competition and the costs to 
maintain the status quo are quickly approaching unsustainability for the United States.  
Charles Glaser draws a similar conclusion as Freeman in that the United States 
should abandon its commitments to Taiwan to pave the way toward an improved and 
cooperative relationship with China. They differ, however, in the method for arriving at 
this conclusion. Whereas Freeman seeks to decrease commitments toward Taiwan as a way 
to place greater emphasis on the relationship between the United States and China, Glaser 
offers a review of the structural pressures between the United States and China. Glaser 
states that the realist approach need not be “pessimistic,” instead arguing that “China’s rise 
need not be nearly as competitive and dangerous as the standard realist argument suggests, 
because the structural forces driving major powers into conflict will be relatively weak.”20 
To back this assertion, Glaser states that “nuclear weapons make it relatively easy for major 
                                                 
17 Freeman. 
18 Freeman. 
19 Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1981), 193–94. 
20 Charles Glaser, “Will China’s Rise Lead to War?,” Foreign Affairs 90, no. 2 (April 2011): 81. 
 
9 
powers to maintain highly effective deterrent forces… Large-scale conventional attacks by 
China against the U.S. homeland, meanwhile, are virtually impossible because the United 
States and China are separated by the vast expanse of the Pacific Ocean.”21 Therefore, “the 
overall effect of these conditions is to greatly moderate the security dilemma. Both the 
United States and China will be able to maintain high levels of security now and through 
any potential rise of China to superpower status.”22 In short, Glaser argues that nuclear 
deterrence and the impossibility of conventional attacks, which is applicable to both the 
United States and China, significantly diminishes the security dilemma. Much like the 
other realist scholars, Glaser pays heed to the ease of nuclear escalation in the event of a 
crisis over Taiwan; furthermore, Glaser asserts that continued armament of Taiwan could 
lead to a spiraling nuclear and conventional arms race between the United States and 
Taiwan.23 Hence, given the combination of the low security dilemma with the catastrophic 
risks, the United States ought to recede from commitments to Taiwan. Glaser concludes 
that “this [withdraw from commitments toward Taiwan] would remove the most obvious 
and contentious flash point between the United States and China and smooth the way for 
better relations between them in the decades to come.”24 
Given the intense structural pressures created by the rise of China, Graham Allison 
asserts that the United States and China must both more carefully manage their relations to 
avoid succumbing to the Thucydides Trap. In his prelude article for The Atlantic in 
September 2015, Allison concludes that:  
what strategists need most at the moment is not a new strategy, but a long 
pause for reflection. If the tectonic shift caused by China’s rise poses a 
challenge of genuinely Thucydidean proportions, declarations about 
‘rebalancing,’ or revitalizing ‘engage and hedge,’ or presidential hopefuls’ 
                                                 
21 Glaser, 83. 
22 Glaser, 83. 
23 Glaser, 87. 
24 Glaser, 87. 
 
10 
calls for more ‘muscular’ or ‘robust’ variants of the same, amount to little 
more than aspirin treating cancer.25  
Allison’s thesis rebuts the policies of the past (engage and hedge), policies of the present 
at time of writing (rebalancing), and 2016 presidential election rhetoric toward China 
(muscular/robust) as inept. Instead, Allison states that China’s epic rise is a pragmatic 
condition, not a problem needing solved. “Managing this relationship without war will 
demand sustained attention, week by week, at the highest level in both countries.”26 In his 
subsequently published book Destined for War, Allison offers a much greater amount of 
detail, first outlying his argument of a so-called “Thucydides Trap,” followed by his 
assertion that the competition between China and the United States fits this profile. As he 
mentions throughout the book and article, 12 of the 16 cases of hegemonic struggle studied 
in the previous half millennium have led to war; only those that were carefully managed 
throughout the shifting cycle were able to avoid catastrophic consequences to all parties 
involved. To manage the struggle between the United States and China, Allison 
recommends a “review [of] all the strategic options—even the ugly ones.”27 The strategies 
outlined in this section of Allison’s book are led first by one of accommodation, where he 
offers that a curtailment of commitments toward Taiwan could permit Chinese concessions 
elsewhere within the shifting international system deemed of higher strategic interest to the 
United States.28 
Former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral (ret.) Bill Owens made 
a similar plea to Freeman and Glaser in November 2009, opting for pursuit of cooperation 
between the United States and China. With regards to the Taiwan Relations Act, Owens 
states that “it is the basis on which we continue to sell arms to Taiwan, an act that is not in 
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our best interest.”29 After acknowledging a rising China, Owens rebukes the pessimistic 
realism approaches, concluding that “the solution is to approach the US/China relationship 
not with hedging, competition, or watchfulness, but with cooperation, openness and 
trust.”30 Owens does not quite go as far as to recommend completely abandoning 
commitments toward Taiwan, but this is implied in his closing remarks, “the US-China 
relationship is a vital interest for the two countries and the world.”31 
At the time of Freeman’s speech, the United States was in the early stages of what 
now would be constituted as a historic bull market. Despite the continuation of annual 
federal deficits adding to the federal debt, the primary suggestions of sustainability offered 
by Freeman does not seem to be totally viable, at least not yet. As evident by increased 
military spending, especially during the Trump presidency, the United States continues to 
significantly outspend China. This said, despite the “dismal” growth rate of 6.2% for the 
quarter ended June 2019, which dwarfs the growth rates in the United States, would serve 
as the basis for proof to Freeman’s claim that unsustainability will eventually come to 
fruition; this point of relative growth rates was also highlighted by Allison in both his 
article in The Atlantic and throughout his book. 
b. Great Power Competition, Double-down on Efforts to Arm Taiwan 
(Confront China) 
The second primary policy option calls for confronting China through a doubling-
down of efforts to arm Taiwan. In the article “Should the United States Abandon Taiwan?,” 
Nancy Bernkopf Tucker and Bonnie Glaser agree with the assessments by Freeman and 
Allison of China’s rise, however, starkly conclude that strength must be projected as a way 
of maintaining the status quo. In answering the question posed by the title of the article, 
the authors conclude “that the United States should neither abandon nor reduce its 
                                                 






commitments to Taiwan, but strengthen them.”32 In building this argument, the authors 
critique the benefits of the retrenchment strategy; contrary to the conclusions drawn by 
Freeman and Allison, Tucker and Glaser assert that “a U.S. sacrifice of Taiwan, while 
gratifying, could not thoroughly slake a continuing need for Beijing to demonstrate its 
power. Indeed, the sacrifice might promote new appetites and necessitate fresh efforts to 
satisfy that need.”33 They further counter that an abandonment of Taiwan would not 
necessarily permit other grand bargains to resolve the conflicting interests between the 
United States and China, namely the divide of the Korean Peninsula,34 something that 
Allison briefly begs the question in Destined for War.35 Tucker and Glaser conclude that 
“China would respond to appeasement as have virtually all governments: it would conclude 
that a weaker United States lacking vision and ambition could be pressured and 
manipulated.”36 They further assert that a compromise solution of halting arms sales to 
Taiwan while otherwise maintaining support, would gradually erode Taiwan’s ability to 
deter an invasion by China. In addition to their staunch defense of the deterrent measures 
provided by a more defensively capable Taiwan, the authors also focus on the importance 
of continued support to Taiwan for the sake of democracy. As a democratic state, the people 
of Taiwan must have a resolute say in the future status of Taiwan. 
Former National Security Advisor John Bolton also subscribes to this policy option. 
In light of President Trump’s acceptance of the congratulatory phone call by Tsai Ing-wen, 
Bolton penned an op-ed in the Wall Street Journal, concluding that “America could 
enhance its East Asia military posture by increasing U.S. military sales to Taiwan and by 
again stationing military personnel and assets there, probably negotiating favorable 
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terms.”37 Bolton asserts “it is high time to revisit the ‘One-China policy’ and decide what 
America thinks it means… Let’s see how an increasingly belligerent China responds.”38 
Throughout the disparaging op-ed, Bolton draws on the fundamentally different 
contemporary circumstances to those that were evident during Richard Nixon and Jimmy 
Carter’s pursuit of détente. In his argument calling for the United States to increasingly 
fortify the defense posture of Taiwan, Bolton does so from a base of utilizing Taiwan as an 
instrument to control the great power competition between the United States and China. In 
other words, the focus is on Taiwan in order to deter conflict with China, much less about 
Taiwan for the sake of democracy.  
c. Great Power Competition, The Shifting Balance of Power Requires a 
Revamped One-China Policy 
The third primary policy option calls for a recognition of the shifting balance of 
power and resultant great power competition, and how this will have a negative effect to 
the United States’ ability to maintain the One-China policy. Robert Sutter penned an article 
in 2009, about a year after Ma Ying-jeou assumed the presidency of Taiwan, bringing the 
return of the Kuomintang party to the forefront of politics in Taiwan, and with it a different 
set of challenges for the United States, compared to the previous eight years of leadership 
under the Democratic Progressive Party.39 As Sutter notes, United States’ policy at the 
time welcomed the easing of cross strait tensions that had been subject to consternation 
during the rule of Chen Shui-bian of the Democratic Progressive Party. Sutter argues that 
the easing of tensions and resumption of an approach of “moderation and 
accommodation”40 by Taiwan toward China is actually in contrast to the “longstanding 
U.S. policy goal of maintaining a balance of power and influence in the Taiwan area 
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favorable to Taiwan and U.S. interests and influenced by the United States.”41 In other 
words, Sutter sees the improved diplomacy brought about by return of the less contentious 
Kuomintang party, actually going against the interests of the United States, despite the 
easement of tensions and decreased likelihood for spikes of crisis in the Taiwan Straits. In 
order to maintain the balance, Sutter argues that Taiwan must be defiant against, not 
compliant with China in efforts toward political absorption. This argument rang true in the 
most recent Taiwan presidential cycle albeit flipped, as Han Kuo-yu sought election under 
the Kuomintang banner, at times offering that Taiwan’s economy will likely become more 
prosperous with improved and closer ties to Beijing (this viewpoint has shifted 
significantly in light of the protests in Hong Kong).42 
d. Great Power Cooperation Might be Possible, but Great Power 
Competition is Pragmatic; Attempts to Change the Status Quo too 
Dangerous 
The fourth primary policy option suggests the continuation and maintenance of the 
ambiguity offered by the One-China policy, something that has proven effective in securing 
the true interests of the United States. Whereas Robert Sutter has argued that the United 
States must pay heed to the shifting balance of power, Richard Bush and Alan Romberg 
rebut in the same forum (PacNet), instead placing the emphasis on peace and stability.43 
As noted above, this debate occurred shortly after the resumption of leadership of the 
Kuomintang Party after eight years of tense relations between the United States and the 
Democratic Progressive Party. Bush and Romberg believe that Sutter’s conclusion is based 
on a faulty “assumption that the U.S. would not be willing to take an effective stand against 
PRC coercion or worse against Taiwan.”44 Though they offer that no evidence suggests 
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this assumption might be true, the very fact that this could be debated as an assumption 
speaks to the ambiguity, which is in turn what Bush and Romberg argue has been a pillar 
for maintaining the peace between the United States and China. Furthermore, the authors 
advocate a status quo approach because they believe that attempts to change are at least as 
equally dangerous. Of the same thought, Shelley Rigger asserts “such a change would 
indeed delight Beijing, but it would create new problems just as intractable as the old ones 
but less familiar and potentially even more challenging.”45 
In Bush’s “A One-China Policy Primer,” he provides an extensive review of the 
history of relations that have come to define the United States’ One-China policy and the 
contradicting Chinese viewed (and imposed upon the international community), One-
China Principle. Bush believes that so long as Taiwan does not violate the terms in China’s 
Anti-Secession Law, then Beijing would prefer to unify through political measures and 
negotiation.46 Bush continues by stating that: 
one factor strengthening that preference is the adherence of the United 
States to the One-China policy, plus the possibility that the United States 
would intervene to defend Taiwan in case of an attack. So even though this 
linkage is not a binding commitment and should be constantly reevaluated, 
a probabilistic statement is possible: Beijing is more likely to stick to its 
peaceful policy as long as Washington adheres to its One-China policy.47  
In other words, despite the rise of China, arguable decline of the United States, and other 
aspects of the arguments presented in the above alternate primary policy options, Bush 
believes that Bolton is wrong in claiming that “it is high time to revisit the ‘One-China 
policy.’”48 In describing previous policy approaches that Bush coins “dual deterrence,” 
Bush states that: 
Washington had both warnings and reassurances for both sides of the 
Taiwan Strait. To Beijing, the U.S. warned against the use of force but 
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stressed that we did not support Taiwan independence. To Taipei, the U.S. 
warned against political steps that objectively might provoke a coercive 
response from the PRC, but offered assurance that the United States would 
not sacrifice Taiwan’s interests for the sake of good relations with 
Beijing.49  
Though Bush does not directly state as such, his “dual deterrence” perfectly defines a 
policy of “strategic ambiguity.”  
e. Great Power Cooperation, Abandon Commitments toward Taiwan, 
Liberalism Approach 
Bruce Gilley offers a liberalism-based approach toward achieving a high level of 
cooperation between the United States and China, drawing similar conclusions as Freeman 
and Allison that the United States should abandon its commitments toward Taiwan. At the 
same time though, Gilley’s rationale and methods are quite contrasting from the realist 
approaches discussed above. Gilley argues that Taiwan would best serve its own interests 
by adopting an approach that Gilley coins “Finlandization.” Gilley explains Finlandization 
as a scenario under which: 
Taiwan would reposition itself as a neutral power, rather than a U.S. 
strategic ally, in order to mollify Beijing’s fears about the island’s becoming 
an obstacle to China’s military and commercial ambitions in the region. In 
return, Beijing would back down on its military threats, grant Taipei 
expanded participation in international organizations, and extend the island 
favorable economic and social benefits.50  
Anticipating realist critiques, Gilley further explains “Taiwan has played a strategic role in 
U.S. foreign policy since the 1940s… The tragic results of this policy, however, has been 
that it has played into Beijing’s fears of encirclement and naval inferiority, which in turn 
has prompted China’s own military buildup.”51 Gilley argues that the One-China and 
strategic ambiguity policies serve to prevent the achievement of Taiwan neutrality through 
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stating that “in the past, U.S. ‘noninterference’ meant maintaining the balance of power 
across the strait and challenging Beijing’s provocations. Today, it means reducing the 
militarization of the conflict and not interfering with Taiwan’s Finlandization.”52 
Furthermore, Gilley points out that “in 1982, the United States pledged to China that it 
would reduce its arms sales to Taiwan—a promise that it has conspicuously broken ever 
since.”53 According to Gilley, these realist approaches of preserving the balance of power 
and credibly arming Taiwan for the sake of deterrence embolden Taiwan in a way that 
garners anxiety to the Chinese, both of which ultimately prevent the cooperation necessary 
that would lead to mutual gain for the United States, China, and Taiwan.  
D. HYPOTHESES AND POLICY OPTIONS 
Upon review of the competing literature, follow-on research will be focused toward 
analyzing the policy options represented by accommodation, confrontation, and status quo. 
Accordingly, these policy options will be analyzed to determine if the One-China policy 
remains the best policy approach toward China and Taiwan.  
1. Accommodate China 
The arguments suggesting that the United States shall abandon its commitments 
toward Taiwan is correct given the rise of China, especially when viewed in relative terms 
to the arguable decline of the United States. Robert Gilpin’s insights gained from the study 
of hegemonic war theory tell us that this rise will lead to a disequilibrium in the 
international system. Furthermore, and in large part because of this disequilibrium, the 
continued defensive commitments toward Taiwan no longer serve the national interest of 
the United States; though the United States may prefer that Taiwan remain a prosperous 
democracy, Washington should instead prioritize its relationship with Beijing, especially 
relative to the competing rise of China. As a matter of returning to equilibrium, the United 
States must seek to reduce commitments. In this particular case, a reduction of 
commitments is best served through retrenchment, more specifically in form of 
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accommodation. By reducing and/or abandoning commitments toward Taiwan, the United 
States will reduce the structural frictions and pressures of the rise of China, thereby 
bringing the current international system to equilibrium and avoiding catastrophic conflict 
with China. The relative rise of China across nearly every measure of diplomatic, 
information, military, and economic effectiveness, deem the maintenance of the status quo 
an invalid policy option. The ambiguity of the One-China policy, and the defensive 
commitments toward Taiwan in the Taiwan Relations Act must be revamped to 
accommodate the rise of China.  
2. Confront China 
Pursuit of the Chinese Dream through a rising China has been anything but 
peaceful. Chinese rhetoric of its century of humiliation provides the basis for its stake 
toward rejuvenation as it strives to achieve the Chinese Dream by 2049. Chinese historical 
aggressive nature toward Taiwan, to include a contemporary refusal to rule out using 
military force to reunify Taiwan with the mainland, foreshadow its intentions toward the 
rest of the region. Much like Hitler’s thirst was not quenched through appeasement, 
Chinese stated ambitions toward reunifying the wayward Taiwan Province will not be 
suppressed; attempts to do so will only serve to further embolden China. Taiwan is a 
regional stalwart, perfectly demonstrating the effectiveness of democratic and capitalistic 
institutions. The United States had maintained a uniquely friendly relationship with Taiwan 
to balance against the rise of communism; though an opportunity for rapprochement 
existed in 1972, the timing of the Taiwan Relations Act was anything but coincidental. The 
Taiwan Relations Act and President Reagan’s “Six Assurances” have permitted the United 
States to provide Taiwan with a military deterrent, and given the modern day rise of 
Chinese military capabilities, a doubling down of defensive commitments toward Taiwan 
is in order. Concurrently, Beijing needs to be made keenly aware of United States 
intentions toward the protection of the democratic people of Taiwan; the permitted 
ambiguity of the One-China policy clouds the matter. The ascendancy of John Bolton to 
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the National Security Advisor to President Trump had been fitting given his rhetorically 
confrontational claim that “it is high time to revisit the ‘One-China Policy.’”54 
3. Maintenance of the Status Quo through Minor Adjustments 
The effectiveness of the One-China policy in maintaining regional peace is 
inarguable. The ambiguities are inherent to the policy, as is the choice to purposefully not 
have a formal declaration of precisely the commitments that might be entailed within the 
policy. The ambiguities created through providing both “warnings and reassurances”55 to 
each China and Taiwan has and will continue to foster diplomacy, concurrently allowing 
for the exponential economic expansion for Taiwan, China, and the United States. Attempts 
to change course now, especially given the change of the strategic environment are 
inherently dangerous, and even if initially effective or encouraging, have a high likelihood 
of presenting a new set of unfamiliar and unknowable challenges. The One-China policy 
has not been perfect, nor was this ever the intention. But, the ambiguities within the policy 
has kept Chinese aggression at bay, thereby affording a status quo that serves the needs of 
China, Taiwan, and the United States. As such, President Trump will be best served 
surrounded by experts that convey both the pragmatic and beneficial nature of the One-
China policy. 
The policy options represented by Robert Sutter and “Finlandization,” will be 
omitted from follow-on research. Though the views presented by Robert Sutter may again 
become prevalent under a Kuomintang presidential administration, these views have 
become a bit muted since the return to power of the Democratic Progressive Party in 2016. 
“Finlandization” has its merits, however, the growing schisms between the United States 
and China, and more so, the democratic desires of the people of Taiwan make this option 
less relevant for further study.  
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E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
In analyzing which of the hypotheses presents the most persuasive argument, an 
analytical framework will be developed to determine the contemporary viability of each of 
the proposed policy options. Each of the policy options will be reviewed to define their 
characterization of the One-China policy and whether the characterization accurately 
reflects the realities presented by the return to great power competition. This analysis of 
the characterization will point to the perceived successes and failures which have led to the 
assessed necessity for change, and increase my understanding of the advantages, 
disadvantages, and risks associated with each policy option. Finally, each of the policy 
options will be explored to determine how they would look in the context of the future 
great power relations between the United States and China.  
To explore the “Accommodate China” policy option, I intend to study hegemonic 
war theory, beginning with a thorough review of the key tenets offered by Robert Gilpin 
in War and Change in World Politics, followed by subsequent hegemonic realism and 
hegemonic war theory scholarship. Based on this review, I will then seek sources that 
discuss the tenets of this theory to the current context surrounding the international 
relations between the United States and China, and particularly those that include an 
accommodation or otherwise drawback of commitments toward Taiwan.  
To explore the “Confront China” policy option, I intend to study offensive realism, 
beginning with a thorough review of journal articles that outlay the key tenets of offensive 
realism, particularly those authored by John Mearsheimer, followed by carefully reading 
Mearsheimer’s The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. I will then seek sources that apply 
the contemporary geostrategic context to the tenets of offensive realism.  
To test the “Status Quo” policy option, I will seek to become inundated with the 
surrounding history of the relations among the United States, China, and Taiwan. I may 
briefly look at the period prior to 1972, but the focus will begin with Henry Kissinger’s 
initial secret meeting in Beijing in 1971. Research will include Alan Romberg’s Rein In at 
the Brink of the Precipice, Richard Bush’s Uncharted Strait, Shelley Rigger’s Why Taiwan 
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Matters, and Kissinger’s On China. The peace of the previous near half-century will serve 
as the applicable case study in determining the continued viability of the One-China policy. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW  
This thesis will be organized into approximately six chapters. Chapter I consists of 
the relevant information contained within this proposal, primarily the research question, 
significance, literature review, and potential policy options. Chapter II describes the One-
China and strategic ambiguity policies. Chapter III tests the “Accommodate China” policy 
option. Chapter IV tests the “Confront China” policy option. Chapter V tests the “Status 
Quo” policy option, to include a thorough assessment of the viability of the United States 
being able to uphold the commitments as contained in the One-China policy, especially in 








II. DEFINING THE ONE-CHINA POLICY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Shortly after securing the 2016 presidential nomination, Donald Trump accepted 
the phone call from Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen.56 Though the call was intended to 
offer congratulatory remarks, the interaction caused a much larger upstir among global 
China experts.57 Questions began to be asked as to whether this unprecedented phone call 
between the incoming president and his counterpart in Taiwan had in some way violated 
the United States’ One-China policy. Nine days later, Trump told Fox News Sunday that 
“I fully understand the One-China policy, but I don’t know why we have to be bound by a 
One-China policy unless we make a deal with China having to do with other things, 
including trade.”58 The question begged then, as it does now, did President Trump or his 
administration really understand the nuances and complexities of the United States’ One-
China policy? Perhaps in a more general sense, what is the United States’ One-China policy 
and how did it come into being? What are some of the key commitments inherent to the 
One-China policy? The purpose of this chapter serves to describe the One-China policy 
and its purposefully inherent ambiguities, so as to set the stage for an evaluation of the 
primary critiques of the policy.  
In truth, the United States’ One-China policy is not as compact or concisely defined 
as may be suggested with an utterance that the United States has a One-China policy. 
Rather, the One-China policy is a messy and complex amalgamation of three joint 
communiques (Shanghai Communique, Normalization Communique, and the 17 August 
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1982 Communique), the Taiwan Relations Act, President Reagan’s Six Assurances to 
Taiwan, and various subsequent presidential statements.59 As will be seen through 
description below, many aspects and language within these key documents or statements 
were purposefully ambiguous, leaving open the possibility of differing interpretations. This 
is not to suggest that the United States or China had necessarily been acting in bad faith 
throughout their relations, but rather, the carefully selected language would allow the 
primary dispute to be shelved.60 By skirting direct and unambiguous statements regarding 
the future of Taiwan, both the United States and China may have been able to gain 
consensus on other issues, but the diplomatic wordsmithing is rigged with danger. The 
contemporary impact of non-consensus on the issue of Taiwan, more than any other 
dispute, has the potential for catastrophic conflict between nuclear capable superpowers.61 
With the return of great power competition, scholars and diplomats alike have increasingly 
begun to question the tenets of the One-China policy by offering instead their own policy 
prescription to ensure the globally leading role of the United States. The nuances of the 
differing policy prescriptions can only be understood by first gaining comprehension of the 
components of the One-China policy. 
B. SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE (27 FEBRUARY 1972) 
The origins of the One-China policy date primarily to President Nixon’s decision 
to seek a rapprochement with China.62 At the time, Nixon believed that friendlier relations 
with China could lead to an honorable end of the Vietnam War and a balance against the 
Cold War threat posed by the Soviet Union.63 With this in mind, Nixon secretly sent his 
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National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger to Beijing in July 1971 to meet with the 
Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai.64 This secret meeting was intended to lay the groundwork 
that would ultimately lead to Nixon’s historic visit to China in February 1972. At the 
conclusion of Nixon’s trip to China, the United States and China issued a joint communique 
describing the proceedings of the various meetings.65  
Though much of language contained in the joint communique had been determined 
beforehand, the issue of Taiwan was predominant and remained a contentious point 
preventing agreement.66 To China, the future of Taiwan served as a lynchpin for all other 
matters relating to détente. To the United States, the future of Taiwan needs to be resolved 
mutually and peacefully. The two sides reached agreement towards the end of Nixon’s trip 
in Shanghai, hence the common reference of this communique as the Shanghai 
Communique.67 The Shanghai Communique served as the culmination of intense 
diplomacy, paving the way toward rapprochement, or so it was thought.  
A key statement in the Shanghai Communique is that “the United States 
acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one 
China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States Government does not challenge 
that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the 
Chinese themselves.”68 Though seemingly only slightly nuanced, an acknowledgement of 
the Chinese position is very different than a statement of the actual position of the United 
States. Similarly, not challenging the Chinese position, does not definitively equate to 
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alignment with the Chinese position. From the perspective of the United States, these words 
were very carefully crafted so as to purposefully contain a necessary amount of ambiguity 
that would allow for future freedom of action.69 Even still, the language was palatable to 
the Chinese position.  
C. NORMALIZATION COMMUNIQUE (15 DECEMBER 1978) 
Though Nixon had intended to take the next step toward normalization after 
securing reelection later in 1972, Watergate and related domestic politics proved 
insurmountable barriers to progress for both Nixon (before he resigned) and President 
Ford.70 Nearly seven years after Nixon’s initial trip to China, President Jimmy Carter and 
Deng Xiaoping affirmed a second agreement, commonly referred as the Normalization 
Communique.71  
Along with reaffirming the principles contained within the Shanghai Communique, 
the Normalization Communique formally established diplomatic relations between the 
United States and China. Additionally, the Normalization Communique states that “the 
United States of America recognizes the Government of the People’s Republic of China as 
the sole legal government of China.”72 Though this sentiment was absolutely necessary to 
normalize relations, it also represented a forced choice placed upon the United States.73 In 
keeping with Westphalian principles (and the United States’ “acknowledgement of the 
Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is a part of China”74), the 
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recognition of the PRC came at direct cost to continued recognition of the Republic of 
China (Taiwan).75 The United States’ uneasiness with this derecognition of Taiwan is 
apparent in the very next sentence: “Within this context, the people of the United States 
will maintain cultural, commercial, and other unofficial relations with the people of 
Taiwan.”76  
In normalizing relations with China, the United States announced the intent to 
dissolve the Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of China within one year and 
committed to the withdrawal of residual United States military personnel from Taiwan.77 
Not explicitly stated in the text of the communique but very much a part of the preceding 
dialogue, arms sales to Taiwan would continue beyond the expiration of the mutual defense 
treaty.78 “Other unofficial relations” with Taiwan was purposefully ambiguous and vague, 
later permitting the establishment of the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT).79 At the time, 
the mission of AIT was not completely clear; however, it now serves as an unofficial, but 
de facto embassy, carrying out actions of American interests much similar to any other 
United States embassy.  
D. TAIWAN RELATIONS ACT (10 APRIL 1979) 
Up to the point of the Normalization Communique and in accordance with 
presidential mandate, the handlings of this particular aspect of foreign policy resided solely 
within the executive department.80 However, the necessary language of the communiques 
to quell China, did not speak directly to the will of the people of the United States in terms 
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of the defense of Taiwan. Accordingly, and shortly after the Normalization Communique, 
congressional leaders completely overhauled a bill submitted by the Carter Administration 
to address the cultural, commercial, and other unofficial relations noted above.81  
Largely as a result of unilateral action taken by the executive department (as 
opposed to consulting with congress), and the perception that the Carter Administration 
had dismissed Taiwan entirely, the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) was passed in the House 
and Senate with resounding bipartisan approval.82 Interestingly, the TRA attempts to 
explicitly state many of the purposefully ambiguous points of the Shanghai and 
Normalization Communiques:  
The United States decision to establish diplomatic relations with the 
People’s Republic of China rests upon the expectation that the future of 
Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means and that any effort to 
determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by 
boycotts or embargoes is considered a threat to the peace and security of the 
Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States. The United 
States shall provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character and shall 
maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or 
other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or social or 
economic system, of the people of Taiwan.83  
In essence, the TRA imposes congressional curbs to compel consultation and 
inhibit unilateral action by the president with regards to Taiwan, even though the TRA 
effectively summarized the unstated positions of United States policy toward China.84 As 
a result and most probably expected, the TRA drew intense ire from Chinese leaders, 
feelings that would not easily subside, especially during the campaigning and ascendancy 
of Ronald Reagan to the presidency.85  
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E. THIRD JOINT COMMUNIQUE (17 AUGUST 1982) 
As a prelude to his presidential stances toward China, Ronald Reagan’s campaign 
rhetoric reflected his support of the people of Taiwan through emphasis of the officiality 
of the TRA.86 At the angst of Chinese leadership and the Carter Administration alike, 
Reagan’s public statements foreshadowed his emboldened desires to maintain continued 
arms sales to Taiwan and make the AIT as robust as the TRA would possibly allow.87 This 
sentiment was carried forward into Reagan’s presidency and is somewhat (if ambiguously) 
reflected in the Third Joint Communique that readdresses the issue of United States arms 
sales to Taiwan.88  
In the communique, the United States conveyed a committal to gradually reduce 
arms sales to Taiwan, but this statement was contingent (even if unstated explicitly) on 
China continuing to strive for peaceful resolve of the issue of Taiwan.89 In other words, 
the implication from the perspective of the United States was that arms sales would halt 
only if China renounced a pledge to militarily resolve the issue of Taiwan. If Chinese 
military expenditures reflected offensive capabilities that might be useful to initiate an 
attack on Taiwan, the United States could interpret these actions as a defiance of the strive 
for a peaceful resolution. The Chinese perspective that these same offensive capabilities 
could serve in a defensive capacity has long been overlooked, no matter the actual (though 
unknowable) Chinese intentions.  
In fact, the uneasiness that lingered within the Reagan administration had more or 
less already invoked this interpretation.90 This is evident by three separate messages of 
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reassurance delivered to ROC President Chiang Ching-kuo by AIT Director James Lilley, 
more formally referred to as Reagan’s Six Assurances to Taiwan (discussed further 
below).91 Additionally, shortly after the issuance of the Third Joint Communique, Reagan 
wrote a secret codicil to clarify and explain his own interpretation, originally described by 
James Mann in About Face.92 In the secret memorandum, Reagan wrote: 
The U.S. willingness to reduce its arms sales to Taiwan is conditioned 
absolutely upon the continued commitment of China to the peaceful 
solution of the Taiwan-PRC differences. It should be clearly understood that 
the linkage between these two matters is a permanent imperative of U.S. 
foreign policy. In addition, it is essential that the quantity and quality of the 
arms provided Taiwan be conditioned entirely on the threat posed by the 
PRC. Both in quantitative and qualitative terms, Taiwan’s defense 
capability relative to that of the PRC will be maintained.93  
Though the Third Joint Communique was jointly agreed, Reagan and subsequent 
presidential administration have placed nearly zero emphasis to the contents, instead 
largely adopting a stance consistent with the codicil and the Six Assurances. 
F. REAGAN’S SIX ASSURANCES TO TAIWAN 
Concurrent with the issuance of the Third Joint Communique, the Reagan 
Administration authorized ROC authorities to publicly convey the Taipei understanding of 
the intentions of the United States.94 This understanding was captured in six bullets drafted 
by the AIT and endorsed by the Reagan Administration, though emphasis was given to 
Taiwan Vice Foreign Minister Fredrick Chien that Taiwan was to adopt these bullets as its 
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own understandings of the United States’ commitments to Taiwan.95 These six bullet 
points are now more formally referred as the Six Assurances to Taiwan and were designed 
to more clearly state the United States position toward Taiwan, despite the language and 
context of the Third Joint Communique.96  
Though originally drafted to ease any sense of abandonment in Taipei, they largely 
sum up the contemporary stance of the United States toward Taiwan, and thus are worth 
listing verbatim as they were orally conveyed to ROC authorities.  
The United States: 
1. Had not agreed to set a date for ending arms sales to the Republic of 
China. 
2. Had not agreed to hold prior consultations with the PRC regarding arms 
sales to the Republic of China. 
3. Would not play a mediation role between the PRC and the Republic of 
China. 
4. Would not revise the Taiwan Relations Act. 
5. Had not altered its position regarding sovereignty over Taiwan. 
6. Would not exert pressure on the Republic of China to enter into 
negotiations with the PRC.97 
These Six Assurances are a more accurate representation of the sentiment contained 
within Reagan’s codicil with regards to the conditionality that arms sales to Taiwan would 
have with the threat posed by the PRC. Much like the continually increasing threat posed 
by China toward Taiwan (or at least perceived or interpreted as such), arms sales to Taiwan 
have continued throughout all subsequent United States presidential administrations. This 
fact seems to run contrary to the provisions of the Third Joint Communique, but only when 
viewed in the literal meaning of the purposefully ambiguous language. 
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G. SUBSEQUENT PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENTS 
Former President George H. W. Bush stirred waves in the relations between the 
United States and China in 1992 with the abrupt approval of F-16 advanced fighter aircraft 
to Taiwan. Though this decision had a clear appearance of favoring the provisions within 
the TRA, Romberg asserts that this was more of a domestic political act than a clear shift 
away from the status quo.98  President Bush was amidst a close reelection campaign and 
direly needed the support of the state of Texas to have any chance of defeating the rival 
Bill Clinton; to the benefit of Taiwan, General Dynamics’ production line for the F-16 
advanced fighter aircraft was located in Texas.99  Additionally, throughout his 
administration, President Bush had been viewed as not being tough enough towards China, 
particularly through the decision not to publicly rebuke China over its handling of the 
events at Tiananmen Square on 4 June 1989.100  Both of these factors likely influenced 
President Bush to announce his approval of the F-16 advanced fighter aircraft sale to 
Taiwan while visiting the same General Dynamics production plant where these aircraft 
would be built.101   
Though China disapproved of the approval, citing the commitments in the Third 
Joint Communique to gradually halt additional arms sales to Taiwan, it did not choose to 
downgrade its diplomatic relations with the United States.102  Former Ambassador J. 
Stapleton Roy explained to Romberg that this decision to not alter diplomatic relations was 
because China had viewed the approval as a political act garnered to gain domestic 
approval and reelection.103  As a result, the failed reelection bid had a doubly negative 
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impact. Even if China had not initially perceived this approval as a distinct shift away from 
the status quo, Romberg cites a deterioration in confidence that would carry over into the 
Clinton Administration.104 
While on a trip to China, former President Clinton made a statement on 30 June 
1998 that delivered a political shockwave to Taiwan and the Legislative Branch of the 
United States.105  While at the Shanghai Library, President Clinton responded to a reporter 
that he and Chinese President Jiang had discussed the United States’ policy toward the 
issue of Taiwan.106  Clinton goes on to state that “we don’t support independence for 
Taiwan, or two Chinas, or one China-one Taiwan. And we don’t believe that Taiwan should 
be a member in any organization for which statehood is a requirement.”107  Though Clinton 
continues in a following sentence that “our only policy has been that we think it has to be 
done peacefully,”108 the diplomatic and domestic political damage had been done. 
Congress, having felt betrayed by the Executive Branch again regarding United States 
relations with Taiwan, passed resolutions reaffirming support for Taiwan within the weeks 
following President Clinton’s summit to China. Similarly, former Taiwan President Lee 
Teng-hui rebutted Clinton’s statement in a Wall Street Journal op-ed.109  The Clinton 
Administration vehemently insisted that the “three no’s” did not represent a change in 
policy, but was rather consistent with the policy of the preceding twenty years. During a 
press conference on 21 July 1998, President Clinton conveyed that the three pillars to his 
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China policy consisted of a reaffirmation of the TRA, encouragement of cross-Strait 
dialogue, and adherence to the One-China policy.110  Clinton’s statement toned down the 
rhetoric immensely, thereby ensuring the maintenance of the status quo.111   
Cross-Strait tensions began to boil-over as a result of statements made by the former 
Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian that “there is ‘one country on either side’ of the Taiwan 
Strait (yi bian, yi guo) and that Taiwan was neither a part, nor a province, of another 
country.”112  Chen further crossed China’s red line by offering that a public referendum 
should be administered to allow the 23 million people of Taiwan to determine the fate of 
Taiwan.113  Though diplomatic maneuvering by the United States, China, and Taiwan tried 
to prevent the situation from further spiraling, President Chen continued his rhetoric of 
plans for a referendum well into 2003. In a direct rebuke to Chen, President George W. 
Bush made clear that the policy of the United States is that “we oppose any unilateral 
decision by either China or Taiwan to change the status quo, and the comments and actions 
made by the leader of Taiwan indicate that he may be willing to make decisions 
unilaterally, to change the status quo, which we oppose.”114  To this end, by explicitly 
stating the position of the United States, President Bush effectively ensured a return to the 
status quo, even if cross-Strait relations would remain strained throughout the remainder 
of President Chen’s Administration.    
H. CONCLUSION 
These three joint communiques, the TRA, the Six Assurances, and various 
subsequent presidential statements form the basis for the One-China policy of the United 
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States.115 China has been provided the necessary concessions through its own 
interpretation of each of the joint communiques, even if these interpretations are not 
completely aligned with the actual position of the United States.116 At the same time, the 
TRA and Six Assurances has provided reassurances to Taiwan that it has not been 
abandoned in the process.117 When viewed from the perspective of catastrophic conflict 
avoidance, the One-China policy has been a resounding success. The ambiguity of the One-
China policy has effectively served to deter both China and Taiwan from extreme attempts 
to unilaterally alter the status quo.118  
Though not necessarily aligned with the original intent of President Nixon, the One-
China policy continues to be adopted by the United States with the aspiration that China 
will liberalize away from its authoritative methods, including sentiments toward a 
definitive reunification of the wayward province of Taiwan. Despite this yearning, China 
is approaching great power status, while consistently maintaining its core position toward 
reunification, no matter the cost or consequence.119 In essence, the issue of Taiwan has 
continually been left for future generations to resolve, even as the danger and consequences 
continue to exponentially increase. If the Chinese rhetoric is to be believed, eventually the 
issue of Taiwan will come to a head, which brings us back to the contemporary setting of 
the Trump Administration.  
Approximately three weeks after his inauguration, President Donald Trump spoke 
with Chinese President Xi Jinping, in part to clarify his acceptance of the phone call from 
Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen, as well as his comments given during the Fox News 
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interview alluded at the beginning of this chapter.120 The White House readout of the 
phone call between President Trump and President Xi indicates that “President Trump 
agreed, at the request of President Xi, to honor our ‘One-China’ policy.”121 Interestingly, 
the official language would suggest that honoring of the One-China policy came at the 
behest of President Xi, not necessarily because President Trump had the desire to utter it 
unprompted. Seemingly at the time, the diplomatic gaffe had been corrected.  
Though officially the One-China policy has not changed under the Trump 
administration, key actions taken seem to suggest that a policy shift may be underway. The 
Taiwan Travel Act has paved the way for much higher-level diplomatic exchanges among 
leaders in the United States and Taiwan.122 In September 2019, the AIT and the Taiwan 
Economic and Cultural Representative Office (TECRO) signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) regarding certain consular functions.123 Though this MOU is by no 
means unprecedented,124 it does represent the latest example of AIT and TECRO efforts 
to deepen cooperation between the people of the United States and Taiwan.125 More 
recently, President Trump signed the Taiwan Allies International Protection and 
Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI) Act of 2019 into law on March 26, 2020. The TAIPEI 
Act directs the United States government to “support Taiwan in strengthening its official 
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diplomatic relationships as well as other partnerships with countries in the Indo-Pacific 
region and around the world.”126  
These endeavors, along with the recent authorization for arms sales to Taiwan,127 
may merely represent an upkeep of the One-China policy and a continuance of the status 
quo; but they could also signal a shift in policy toward relations between the United States 
and Taiwan. In either case, scholars and diplomats beg the question whether increasing 
relations with Taiwan remains in the national interest of the United States, or if instead a 
different policy approach is more appropriate. The following three chapters of this thesis 
will examine the primary policy option recommendations in context of the modern-rise of 
China. 
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III. ACCOMMODATE CHINA THROUGH AN ABANDONMENT 
OF COMMITMENTS TOWARD TAIWAN 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Scholars and policy experts recommending an abandonment of United States 
commitments toward Taiwan generally draw this conclusion based on their perception that 
the current construct does not properly emphasize the more important geostrategic 
relationship between the United States and China.128 The commitments contained within 
the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) undermine the joint communiques between the United 
States and China, and place an unnecessary, and potentially tragic wedge that serves to 
prevent the best possible relations and international arrangements between the United 
States and China.129 These scholars and policy experts argue that abandoning 
commitments toward Taiwan changes the relationship emphasis to one that favors China; 
the future of Taiwan was and remains the foundation of the One-China policy, and in turn, 
is the key impediment to improved relations between the United States and China.130 
Though this policy option contains persuasive merits, serious flaws in the argument 
become evident through deeper analysis. Supporting scholars and policy experts base their 
argument on the assertion that China is rapidly approaching economic and military parity 
with the United States.131 Though China has certainly achieved historic strides, the parity 
gap remains significantly larger than the scholars and policy experts advocating for an 
accommodation strategy assert. For this reason, this thesis has concluded that undergoing 
an accommodation policy option is unnecessary, while also potentially catastrophic.  
The purpose of this chapter will be to further analyze this accommodating policy 
option in order to determine its relative persuasiveness and explanatory power to the other 
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primary policy options. Through analysis, this chapter seeks to answer three primary 
research questions. First, why have supporting scholars and policy experts concluded that 
the current One-China policy is failing, and that a more accommodating approach is 
necessary? Second, what would be the key implementational tenets of this policy option if 
applied to the contemporary relationship between the United States and both China and 
Taiwan respectively? Third, what are the key advantages and disadvantages of adapting 
this policy option?  
To answer these research questions, this chapter will consist of three primary 
sections of analysis. The first section will analyze the necessity of the accommodation 
policy option. The second section will elaborate upon the key tenets and implementation 
requirements of an accommodation strategy. The third section will list and analyze the key 
advantages and disadvantages of adopting an accommodation strategy.  
B. ANALYSIS OF THE NECESSITY FOR AN ACCOMMODATION 
STRATEGY  
The modern day rise of China is the most basic reasons used to support the policy 
option represented by an abandonment of commitments toward Taiwan. First, scholars and 
policy experts state that this rise is quickly approaching parity with the United States, often 
even suggesting that parity has already been achieved or exceeded.132 Second, because of 
the nearing parity, the United States must adopt policies that are palatable, and therefore 
more satisfying to China in order to avoid a violent and dangerous struggle that would be 
predicted by the power transition theory,133 also coined as the Thucydides Trap by Graham 
Allison as referenced in Chapter I.134 Third, Robert Gilpin asserts that in order for a 
strategy of appeasement to be successful, it must be voluntarily conducted as early as 
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possible, long before a rising power approaches parity with the established power.135 “Yet, 
not to retrench voluntarily and then to retrench in response to threats or military defeat 
means an even more severe loss of prestige and weakening of one’s diplomatic 
standing.”136 Fourth, John Mearsheimer asserts that Taiwan, faced with nightmarish long 
term prospects relative to the rise of China, would probably be best served to unilaterally 
adopt the “Hong Kong strategy.”137 Though stopping short of directly recommending that 
the United States abandon Taiwan, an abandonment becomes overcome by events should 
Taiwan unilaterally pursue the realpolitik strategy proposed by Mearsheimer. Fifth, Hugh 
White contends that the changed geostrategic environment requires that the United States 
be willing to share power with China.138 A key element of this power sharing is a 
significant reduction in the United States’ East Asian commitments, including those 
provided to Taiwan.139 White continues to state that “there is no reason for the United 
States to oppose eventual, peaceful, consensual reunification of Taiwan with China, and 
every reason to encourage it.”140 For these reasons, scholars and policy experts in support 
of this policy option recommend that the United States prioritize its relationship with China 
over that of Taiwan. The next subsections will analyze the factuality of the argument that 
China is approaching parity with the United States in terms of economic and military 
power.  
1. Economic Parity? 
Tables 1 and 2 depict key economic metrics for both China and the United States 
for the years 1980 and 2018 (1980 is the earliest year available on the IMF website, while 
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at the same time is generally representative of the time period at which normalization 
occurred). These two tables depict the vast Chinese economic growth achieved between 
the two periods, while also showing the relative comparison to that of the United States. 
Specifically, these tables offer four key insights. First, though the United States annual 
gross domestic product (GDP) was 10X higher than China in 1980, this gap has closed 
considerably, now representing a difference of approximately 1.5X in favor of the United 
States. Though this gap has narrowed drastically, therefore lending support for the rising 
China argument, the difference in terms of dollars remains substantial and is in excess of 
$7 Trillion dollars. Second, when converted for purchasing power parity, the Chinese GDP 
exceeds the United States. Graham Allison’s Thucydides Trap Project prefers a comparison 
of GDP after having been converted to PPP to convey extra emphasis of the sheer size of 
the Chinese economy. Third, differences remain very large when adjusted to a per capita 
basis, a measurement that Michael Beckley offers is more representative of the efficiency 
of the economy.141 In other words, the 2018 Chinese GDP per capita is merely 15% of the 
2018 United States GDP per capita, suggesting that the United States’ economy is nearly 
seven times more efficient than the Chinese economy. The final key insight uses a 
measurement of GDP X GDP per capita that will be referred to as the “Beckley Index” for 
the purposes of this thesis.142 Beckley argues that this measurement is a better determinant 
of economic power that better accounts for economic stock (Beckley calls “net 
resources”).143 Measuring the relative stock of the respective economies can prove 
superior to a mere comparison of the flows (represented by annual GDP) because it 
accounts for the accumulated gains that have been achieved throughout the period, as 
opposed to merely the annual gain.144 Therefore, a relative comparison using the Beckley 
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Index suggests that the Chinese economic stock remains less than 10% of the economic 
stock of the United States.  
Table 1. 1980 Key Economic Metrics for China and the United States (in 
current U.S. Dollars).145  
 China United States 
GDP $305.348 Billion $2857.325 Billion 
GDP PPP $305.579 Billion $2857.325 Billion 
GDP Per Capita $309.354 $12,552.943 
GDP per Capita PPP $309.588 $12,552.943 
Table 2. 2018 Key Economic Metrics for China and the United States (in 
current U.S. Dollars).146  
 China United States 
GDP $13,368.073 Billion $20,580.25 Billion 
GDP PPP $25,278.767 Billion $20,580.25 Billion 
GDP Per Capita $9580.239 $62,868.917 
GDP per Capita PPP $18,116.045 $62,868.917 
Beckley Index $128,069.334 Trillion $1,293,858.029 Trillion 
Beckley Index PPP $457,951.281 Trillion $1,293,858.029 Trillion 
 
A closer analysis of these figures quickly dispels the economic related concerns 
offered by scholars and policy experts supporting a withdrawal of commitments toward 
Taiwan. First, though GDP PPP is the preferred measure of comparison because it tends to 
offer greater support for their argument, GDP PPP is misleading when used to make a 
relative comparison of economic power. GDP PPP is useful for domestic consumption cost 
comparison between different countries; however, it does not accurately portray the 
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spending power for goods purchased on international markets.147 Second, the differences 
in economic stock represented by the Beckley Index are stark and will continue to increase 
up until the point that China achieves economic parity with the United States (as measured 
by GDP). Only at this point of economic parity (and beyond) will the stock difference begin 
to contract and reverse. Though economic parity is predicted in the coming future, 
overcoming the existent stock differences will require decades of sustained economic 
growth that matches or exceeds the most recent (declining) growth rate of 6.0%.148 Finally, 
though this most recent GDP growth rate of 6.0% dwarfs that of the most recent figure for 
the United States (2.1%),149 China will be severely challenged to maintain a growth rate 
this high. This is already evident by the deceleration that has occurred and that 6.0% 
represents the slowest pace in nearly thirty years.150 The Political Economist Dwight 
Perkins expects that this downward trend will continue even if China proves capable of 
avoiding the middle-income trap; since the time that Perkins’ East Asia Development was 
published (2013), China’s economy has followed the declining trajectory predicted by 
Perkins.151 
2. Military Parity?  
The most common method for determining a state’s military power analyzes total 
annual defense expenditures; however, it does not take account the accumulation of 
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capability that is inherently required for complex military systems.152 According to 
Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth, “annual military expenditures measure flow—but 
flows over many years produce a stock of military capability.”153 In other words, a simple 
comparison of differing state’s defense expenditures for a given year is incomplete. Greater 
context is gathered through analyzing the accumulation of defense expenditures (sum of 
annual “flows”) over a specified period to account for a “stock” of military capability.154 
The most obvious observance of a state’s stock of military capability is the accumulation 
of complex military systems, such as aircraft carriers, submarines, and military aircraft.155 
Less obvious, but equally important to the operation of these complex military systems, 
are what Toshi Yoshihara and James Holmes call “software.”156 The software is the 
accumulation of institutional knowledge gained from long term training, education, 
doctrine, and research and development.157  
Table 3 depicts the total reported defense expenditures by the United States and 
China since 2010. Through analysis of this information, three key insights become evident. 
First, the United States’ defense expenditure flows vastly exceed those of China for every 
year since 2010. Second, China’s stock of military capability since 2010 ($1,703,062M) is 
less than one third of the United States’ military stock for the same period ($6,064,432M). 
Put another way, the total difference of stock of military capability is approximately 
eighteen times greater than the 2018 Chinese defense expenditure flow ($4,361,370M vs. 
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$239,223M). Third, this military stock gap will continue to grow for as long as the United 
States’ annual flow exceeds China’s annual flow. The gap will only begin to close when 
the Chinese annual flow begins to exceed the United States’. To be sure, Table 3 only 
depicts the flows and stock since 2010; the actual stock gap is much larger if accounting 
for preceding periods during which the United States’ defense expenditures far exceeded 
China’s. 
Table 3. Total (Reported) Defense Expenditures (in constant 2017 U.S. 
Million Dollars).158 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Total 
USA 784,835 775,156 731,086 673,102 631,513 616,483 612,889 605,803 633,565 6,064,432 
China 137,890 148,656 161,441 176,476 191,627 204,202 215,718 227,829 239,223 1,703,062 
Difference 646,945 626,500 569,645 496,626 439,886 412,281 397,171 377,974 394,342 4,361,370 
 
Table 4 depicts defense expenditures as a percent of GDP for both the United States 
and China since 2010, providing three additional insights into the respective military power 
of the two countries. First, for the period since 2010, the United States has had a 
consistently higher percentage of GDP allocated to defense expenditures. Second, the 
percent of GDP allocation for China has remained relatively constant at about 2% for every 
year since 2010. Third, China would have to increase its current percent of GDP allocation 
by nearly 70% to match the allocation of the United States. When considering that the 
continued improvement of domestic economic conditions is a key pillar upholding the 
legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP),159 a significant increased proportion 
to match or exceed the allocation of the United States of GDP allocated for defense 
expenditures would be domestically challenging. 
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Table 4. Defense Expenditures (Reported) as a percent of GDP.160 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
USA 4.7% 4.6% 4.2% 3.8% 3.5% 3.3% 3.2% 3.1% 3.2% 
China 1.9% 1.8% 1.8% 1.9% 1.9% 1.9% 1.9% 1.9% 1.9% 
Difference 2.8% 2.8% 2.4% 1.9% 1.6% 1.4% 1.3% 1.2% 1.3% 
 
This analysis of the Chinese military power highly suggests that the military 
prowess of the United States has and will likely continue to far exceed that of China for 
the foreseeable future,161 thereby discrediting the military power related concerns offered 
by scholars and policy experts recommending a withdrawal of commitments toward 
Taiwan. Put another way, Chinese military power is not rapidly approaching parity, despite 
the often-used rhetoric that China is now a peer threat of the United States.  
Though this analysis alone appears quite compelling, this discrediting is further 
strengthened if one considers two additional variables. First, China has several territorial 
disputes along its borders that represent potential military flashpoints, and therefore require 
due diligence in terms of military planning and expenditures (specifically Japan, India, 
Russia, Vietnam, and Taiwan to name a few).162 Second, the United States has an 
asymmetric nuclear weapon capability advantage, both in terms of offensive weapons and 
the ability to defend against Chinese nuclear weapon capabilities.163 That said, the mere 
presence of a Chinese nuclear weapon capability serves as a significant deterrent to Taiwan 
to provoke or otherwise unilaterally attempt to alter the status quo, because of the 
ambiguity in the One-China policy and in spite of China’s no first use policy.164 Similarly, 
the inherent ambiguity of the TRA as to whether the United States will come to the defense 
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of Taiwan, particularly when considering nuclear weapons, serves as a significant deterrent 
to China.165 Though this mutual nuclear deterrent brings credit to the argument and 
conclusions posed by Charles Glaser as presented in Chapter I, he does not seem to consider 
the disproportionate lack of economic and military parity posited above. Therefore, 
Glaser’s argument is also not compelling in terms of necessity for a change to the inherent 
strategic ambiguity in the One-China policy.  
C. IMPLEMENTATION OF AN ACCOMMODATION STRATEGY 
The analysis of the implementation steps necessary for an accommodation strategy 
will consist of two subsections. The first subsection will analyze the steps necessary for a 
literal, even extreme adoption of an accommodation strategy. The second subsection will 
analyze the implementation steps for a lighter, more practical accommodation. 
1. Extreme Accommodation Policy Option 
Scholars and policy experts recommending an abandonment of United States’ 
commitments toward Taiwan base their recommendation on the belief that the United 
States relationship with the rising China is more important to the national security of the 
United States. This extreme accommodation policy option consists of four key 
implementational tenets. First, additional weapons sales to Taiwan should be immediately 
be halted.166 Weapons sales to Taiwan have long poisoned the more important relationship 
between the United States and China, and therefore a continuation will serve to further 
increase friction within the international system. The United States made a commitment in 
the Third Joint Communique of 1982 to gradually reduce arms sales to Taiwan,167 yet to 
date it has continually failed to uphold its end of the bargain. This commitment, especially 
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considering the rise of China, should have a compelling effect on the leadership of the 
United States to halt further armament efforts to Taiwan.  
Second, the United States shall rescind the legislation contained within the TRA.168 
The Taiwan Relations Act directly undermines the tenets of the three joint communiques 
and run counter to the improved relationship that had been envisioned by Nixon and Mao. 
By moving away from this legislation, the United States would send a clear signal to China 
that the United States pragmatically favors its relationship to China over the relationship 
with Taiwan.  
Third, the United States shall place a higher emphasis toward its commitments 
contained within each of the three joint communiques. This would in part be accomplished 
by a repeal of the Taiwan Relations Act, but additional action would prove more reassuring 
to China. The United States One-China policy should be stated unambiguously, such as 
when President Clinton conveyed his “three no’s.”169 Though an adherence to the tenets 
of the previous joint communiques would be highly reassuring to China, the changes in the 
geostrategic environment for both China and the United States may warrant that a new 
commitment take the form of a fourth joint communique. 
Fourth, the United States shall unambiguously state that it no longer feels obliged 
by the Six Assurances to Taiwan, and therefore is not compelled to defend Taiwan, even if 
China acts to unilaterally alter the status quo. Repeal of the TRA and recommitment to the 
joint communiques (or adopting a new joint communique) would already be highly 
reassuring to China; however, this reassurance would be further cemented through 
presidential statements that draw away from previous assurances to Taiwan. 
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2. Light Accommodation Policy Option 
A potentially more practical policy adoption would address many of the same 
implementation steps noted above, however, would seek to achieve far less provocatively. 
This light accommodation policy option would consist of two key implementation tenets.  
First, a gradual reduction of arms sales to Taiwan remains necessary, eventually 
halting all future sales altogether. As Owens alludes, this gradual halt should be based on 
a reciprocal reduction of cross strait threat posed by China to Taiwan.170 As a first step, 
the United States could adopt an apprehensive stance towards future arms sales to Taiwan, 
making it clear to China that this apprehension seeks a Beijing response to reduce and 
eliminate the short-range missile threat posed to Taiwan.171 If China responds according 
to the desires of the United States, this could pave a path for further reductions, with an 
eventual termination of future arms sales to Taiwan.  
Second, the United States would need to signal or explicitly state a more 
unambiguous stance toward the commitments contained in both the TRA and each of the 
three joint communiques. A complete legislation reversal away from the TRA will likely 
prove domestically challenging to the United States,172 evidenced by recent unanimous 
passage of the Taiwan Travel Act173 and the Taiwan Allies International Protection and 
Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI) Act.174 Along similar lines, an emplacement of higher 
emphasis toward the three joint communiques could be perceived as an abandonment of 
Taiwan, as had been the case with the original adoption of the TRA by Congress. 
Understanding the inherent challenges that will be encountered from a stark and swift 
accommodation policy adoption, Glaser recommends that “a gradual easing of 
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commitments is likely best, as opposed to a sharp, highly advertised break.”175 Key to this 
statement is avoiding the domestic and international publicity that would be inherent to 
repealing the TRA or over emphasizing the three joint communiques. As a way of avoiding 
the ramifications of a public debate, a fourth communique would be necessary. Unlike the 
three joint communiques that were strictly between the United States and China, a fourth 
communique could seek to include Taiwan, thereby better reflecting the democratic will of 
Taiwan.  
Despite the implications to Taiwan discussed in the above extreme and light 
accommodation policy options, scholars and policy experts in favor of this policy option 
adamantly insist that their views are pragmatically drawn from the rise of China, and 
therefore should not be viewed exclusively as an abandonment of Taiwan. To Graham 
Allison, this is undoubtedly an “ugly” strategy, however, also one that must be considered 
to accommodate the growing power and prestige of an ascendant China.176 Charles Glaser 
has argued that a curtailment of commitments toward Taiwan could provide the United 
States with a significant amount of leverage and negotiating power to compel Chinese 
concessions elsewhere in the region.177  
D. ADVANTAGES / DISADVANTAGES 
An adoption of any United States policy that backs away from commitments toward 
Taiwan offers several advantages that could result from an accommodation toward China. 
At the same time, this type of policy also contains inherent disadvantages and risks. To be 
sure, when analyzed separate from one another, the advantages and the disadvantages are 
both compelling. However, when taken together, as they must be, the appearance reflects 
a reprioritization of the relationship with China at the direct expense to the United States’ 
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relationship with Taiwan. For the purposes of this chapter, three key advantages and three 
key disadvantages will be discussed. 
1. Advantages 
First and probably foremost, an accommodation strategy would remove the 
foundational dispute between the United States and China.178 Some scholars have 
concluded that this is the preeminent disagreement that could quickly escalate up to and 
including nuclear conflict between the United States and China.179 Much of this rationale 
is derived from the regional implications of Chinese overreach to non-peacefully alter the 
status quo, but which could quickly spiral to regional, or even global conflict. As such, an 
accommodation on the future of Taiwan could significantly decrease the potential that a 
conflict with China might involve an exchange of nuclear weapons.180 To be sure, the 
United States would have to persuade its regional allies that a United States 
accommodation on the future of Taiwan is also within each of their respective national 
interests, and that this abandonment of commitments is not a foreshadowing of their own 
future relationship with the United States.181 This advantage could be achieved through 
adoption of either the extreme or light accommodation policy option. 
Second, an accommodation strategy would reprioritize the United States 
relationship with China to be of greater consequence than that of Taiwan.182 Scholars and 
policy experts in support of this policy option would argue that the great power competition 
with China has more profound national interest implications to the United States than the 
continued prosperity of Taiwan, and so a prioritization of relationships should be 
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reflected.183 However, the advantageous effects of this reprioritization remain only if 
China in turn decides to maintain the status quo, or at least does not attempt to non-
peacefully alter the status of Taiwan. This advantage would become more apparent through 
an adoption of the extreme accommodation policy option, though China may be satisfied 
by an adoption of the light accommodation policy. 
Third, an accommodation strategy has the potential for a grand bargain with China 
over other regional and global matters.184 Glaser and Allison have both argued that an 
accommodation with China over the future of Taiwan could lead to Chinese concessions 
in areas of higher national interest to the United States. These concessions could potentially 
include a stronger Chinese hand in resolving North Korean nuclear proliferation185 or 
concessions to its territorial claims in the East China Sea and the South China Sea.186  
Particularly because the economic and military power parity gap is very large, the United 
States will be entering a negotiation from a position of relative strength. Through adhering 
to Robert Gilpin’s advice to accommodate early, the United States would have profoundly 
more leverage now than anticipated in the future, and so would likely be able to achieve a 
grander bargain the sooner it acts.187  By delaying, the leverage begins to diminish, in turn 
decreasing the potential benefits of achieving a great power agreement. However, this only 
remains an advantage if a negotiated settlement is voluntarily followed through and not 
later reneged. This advantage could be achieved through adoption of either the extreme or 
light accommodation policy option.    
2. Disadvantages 
First, an accommodation strategy would come at the direct cost of the United States 
relationship with Taiwan. In fact, it could very well lead to the end of a democratic Taiwan 
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should China feel emboldened to reunify Taiwan with the mainland. Taiwan is a 
quintessential example of a vibrant democracy, and so an abandonment of commitments 
toward Taiwan would run directly counter to the democratic values that the United States 
has long advocated for globally. Abandoning commitments toward Taiwan would probably 
equate to the final straw of the already dire and nearly inconsequential international 
recognition of Taiwan. An abandonment of commitments toward Taiwan could in turn 
have repercussions for other globally burgeoning democracies, particularly if abandonment 
is followed by reunification. This disadvantage is possible if either the extreme or light 
accommodation policy option is adopted, though is certainly more likely with an adoption 
of the extreme option. 
Second, an abandonment of commitments toward Taiwan would have direct 
consequences to the credibility of the United States toward its regional alliances.188 Even 
if encapsulated with Chinese concessions in the East China Sea, Japan would ponder the 
strength of its alliance with the United States.189 Similarly, Chinese concessions in the 
South China Sea may have the exact opposite effect desired by the United States. Southeast 
Asian states may feel compelled to contemplate taking a side with either China or the 
United States as a result of the perceived diminishing regional influence of the United 
States.190 South Korea could reflect upon its feelings that the United States would maintain 
its commitments contained in the bilateral mutual defense treaty.191 For these reasons, 
John Mearsheimer has argued that “policy makers in Washington will go to great lengths 
to avoid that outcome and instead maintain America’s reputation as a reliable partner.”192 
Mearsheimer further asserts that “this means they [the United States] will be inclined to 
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back Taiwan no matter what.”193 In short, an abandonment of commitments toward 
Taiwan could completely implode the United States’ regional alliance system. This 
disadvantage is possible if either the extreme or light accommodation policy option is 
adopted, though is certainly more likely with an adoption of the extreme option. 
Third, China may not actually be appeased by an abandonment of United States 
commitments toward Taiwan.194 Much like Hitler was not appeased by the Munich 
Agreement, China may feel emboldened to exert further influence in the region, 
particularly among its various territorial disputes. Undergoing an abandonment strategy 
would have already had a profoundly negative impact to the international prestige of the 
United States that would become exponentially worse by an unappeased China.195 In fact, 
because of the above listed disadvantages that would be encountered in undergoing an 
abandonment strategy, an unappeased China would likely result in the end of an era of 
United States East Asian regional influence, a likelihood that would certainly be contained 
within the original Chinese calculus.196 This disadvantage is possible if either the extreme 
or light accommodation policy option is adopted. 
E. CONCLUSION 
Despite the drastic change in the geostrategic environment and return to great 
power competition, an abandonment of commitments toward Taiwan is unnecessary and 
potentially catastrophic to the credibility of the United States. The claims by Chas Freeman, 
Charles Glaser, Graham Allison, and Bill Owens that China is approaching economic and 
military parity with the United States do not appear to be entirely warranted. Though China 
has and will continue to make historic economic and military improvements, the United 
States’ withdrawal from its commitments to Taiwan would be a premature concession.197 
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The relative economic and military power parity gap remains extremely large and 
will continue to widen for the foreseeable future. In terms of economic power, the United 
States’ economic stock as measured by the “Beckley Index,” is an order of magnitude 
larger than China’s economic stock. This gap will only stop becoming wider after China 
has achieved parity; only then will China begin the decades or longer process of 
overcoming the vast difference in economic power. In terms of military power, the United 
States’ military stock as measured by cumulative defense expenditures, remains nearly four 
times greater than China’s military stock. This gap will only stop becoming wider after 
China has matched the annual defense expenditures of the United States; only then will 
China begin the decades or longer process of overcoming the vast differences in military 
power. Because economic and military power parity remains unforeseeable, the United 
States is not incentivized to consider an accommodation to China, even if conducting an 
accommodation early may provide a more favorable agreement. The risk posed by a 
potentially unappeased China outweighs the potential benefits of a grand bargain. This risk 
and lack of incentivization to accommodate becomes even more apparent when considering 
the catastrophic effects to the credibility of the United States that would be a consequence 
of accommodation.  
The recent protest movements in Hong Kong largely dispel any credible merit to 
the “Hong Kong Strategy” suggested by Mearsheimer, further evidenced by the 
overwhelming re-election of Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen. As such, the necessity to 
abandon commitments toward Taiwan appears unnecessary, even if continued support to 
Taiwan displeases China. Besides the significant loss of international prestige and 
influence, domestic politics within the United States would hinder an adoption of an 
accommodation strategy, as evident by the continually strong bipartisan congressional 
support for the Taiwan Relations Act. Though this strategy does contain highly persuasive 
advantages, the disadvantages are more conclusive, particularly the challenge presented in 
enforcing a potentially unappeased China; therefore, an undertaking of this proportion is 
extremely dangerous. If significantly lacking economic and military parity is deemed 
credible, then one would be compelled to ponder why the United States would consider 
abandoning the vibrant and example setting democracy in Taiwan. The next chapter will 
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explore this question further through analyzing the merits of whether the United States 
would be better served by doubling down on efforts to support Taiwan. 
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IV. CONFRONT CHINA THROUGH A DOUBLE-DOWN OF 
COMMITMENTS TOWARD TAIWAN 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Scholars and policy experts recommending a doubling-down of commitments 
toward Taiwan generally draw this conclusion based on their perception of the necessity 
that the United States assert strength in the ongoing great power competition with 
China.198 This perception is further reinforced when considering the vibrant democracy 
that Taiwan has become in the recent thirty years.199 These scholars and policy experts 
argue that protecting the democracy in Taiwan is reason enough to confront China, 
however, maintaining the regional credibility of the United States is equally important.200 
They contend that the three joint communiques are outdated and do not represent the values 
of the United States, even considering the rise of China.201 Furthermore, because of the 
great power competition with China, upholding the commitments toward Taiwan in both 
the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) and Reagan’s Six Assurances become even more vital to 
the national interest of the United States. Though support for Taiwan comes at direct 
expense to the United States’ relationship with China, regional credibility through the 
protection of democratic values provides more leverage, and thereby influence in 
containing the threat posed by a rising China.202 Much like the abandonment policy option, 
confronting China through supporting Taiwan has persuasive merits; however, deeper 
analysis demonstrates that this policy option is just as dangerous, albeit in different ways. 
For this reason, this thesis concludes that doubling-down on commitments toward Taiwan 
is too provocative, and therefore this policy option should not be adopted.  
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The purpose of this chapter will be to further analyze this confrontational policy 
option in order to determine its relative persuasiveness and explanatory power to the other 
primary policy options. Through analysis, this chapter seeks to answer three primary 
research questions. First, why have supporting scholars and policy experts concluded that 
the current One-China policy is failing, and that the United States should instead double-
down on its efforts to arm and help protect the democratic Taiwan? Second, what would 
be the key implementational tenets of this policy option if applied to the contemporary 
relationship between the United States and both China and Taiwan respectively? Third, 
what are the key advantages and disadvantages of adopting this policy option?  
To answer these research questions, this chapter will consist of three primary 
sections of analysis. The first section will analyze the necessity of the doubling-down 
policy option. The second section will elaborate upon the key tenets and implementation 
requirements of a doubling-down strategy. The third section will identify and analyze the 
key advantages and disadvantages of adopting a doubling-down strategy.  
B. ANALYSIS OF THE NECESSITY FOR A DOUBLING-DOWN STRATEGY  
Scholars and policy experts that advocate for a strategy of doubling-down on the 
United States’ commitments toward Taiwan generally form their argument based on one 
of two primary reasons—or both. First, the United States and China have entered a period 
of great power competition, and so the United States must be postured to compete with 
China in all arenas, including the future of Taiwan.203 Second, Taiwan is a vibrant 
democracy consisting of an increasingly unique identity that appears to be distinctly 
different from the Chinese identity on the mainland.204 This section seeks to analyze these 
two primary arguments to determine the necessity for adopting a policy that would double-
down on commitments toward Taiwan. 
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1. Confront China 
A large part of the focus of the most recent National Security Strategy and the 
National Defense Strategy state that the United States has returned to an era of great power 
competition. As President Trump states in the National Security Strategy, “These 
competitions require the United States to rethink the policies of the past two decades—
policies based on the assumption that engagement with rivals and their inclusion in 
international institutions and global commerce would turn them into benign actors and 
trustworthy partners. For the most part, this premise turned out to be false.”205 Relatedly, 
former Secretary of Defense Mattis states in the National Defense Strategy that “in 
competition short of armed conflict, revisionist powers … [are using] the threat or use of 
military force to change the facts on the ground.”206 Given the context of these two 
statements and the continual renewal of China’s pledge to reunify Taiwan to the mainland 
using any measure necessary,207 advocates argue that the United States must confront 
China over its hostile influence and rhetoric toward the future status of Taiwan.208 The 
United States must take this action as a means of checking the modern day rise of China, 
demonstrating that the international order will not accept Chinese efforts to bully or coerce 
other regional actors.209 In this simple view, the argument at first appears compelling. 
However, the rhetoric of the modern day rise of China is very often over emphasized, 
especially when viewed in cumulative economic and military power parity relative to the 
United States (as discussed in Chapter III).210 So, confronting China on such an explosive 
issue that has dominated the bilateral dialogue for the better part of a half century carries 
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an undue amount of danger and risk, thereby supporting an argument that the adoption of 
this policy option is unnecessary.  
The second part of the confronting China argument recommends that the United 
States bolster Taiwan’s ability to defend itself through an increase of arms sales to Taiwan, 
both in terms of quantity and quality, well beyond those sales that have occurred in the 
past.211 On the surface, this part of the argument also appears reasonable. However, 
Michael Beckley has recently argued that Taiwan is already quite capable of defending 
itself against China, despite the clear asymmetry of relative military capabilities between 
China and Taiwan.212 Beckley’s argument echoes the concerns of the United States 
military in its own ability to project power in East Asia as a result of Chinese Anti-Access 
/ Area Denial (A2AD); however, Beckley turns the tables slightly to demonstrate how 
China would face this same critical power projection task in any attempts to militarily alter 
the Cross-Strait status quo.213 Beckley concludes, “China, therefore, probably could not 
conquer Taiwan, despite the absence of U.S. intervention.”214 Given this, and the 
ambiguity as to whether or not the United States might actually come to Taiwan’s aid in 
the event of Chinese military adventurism, China does not present the existential threat to 
Taiwan that is often portrayed.215 Doubling-down would not have a doubling of deterrent 
result; instead, doubling-down would doubly provoke. Therefore, doubling-down on 
commitments toward Taiwan beyond what has been achieved through the status quo of the 
United States’ One-China policy, is unnecessary. 
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2. Democracy and Identity in Taiwan 
The second primary argument for bolstering commitments toward Taiwan has to 
do with preserving the vibrant democracy and unique identity in Taiwan. Taiwan’s fairly 
high democratic ranking of 31 among all global states,216 along with the increasingly 
growing Taiwan identity,217 make the argument for adopting this policy option 
compelling, particularly if these ideals can only be preserved through an increase of United 
States commitments toward Taiwan. This particular aspect would likely generate a great 
deal of domestic support among the American people, and certainly also among the 
populace in Taiwan. However, the provocative nature toward China of adopting this policy 
option would increase the danger, risk, and stakes considerably, in a way that would likely 
prove to decrease the safety and security of the people of Taiwan.218 This reason, along 
with Beckley’s argument above that Taiwan’s capabilities are already deterring (with the 
aid of arms sales administered under the current One-China policy and the inherent 
strategic ambiguity), decisively demonstrate that an adoption of this policy option does not 
factor well in a cost-benefit analysis, and therefore may be dismissed.  
C. IMPLEMENTATION OF A DOUBLING-DOWN STRATEGY 
The analyzation of the implementation steps necessary for a doubling-down 
strategy will consist of two subsections. The first subsection will analyze the step necessary 
for a literal, even extreme adoption of a doubling-down strategy. The second subsection 
will analyze the implementation steps necessary for a lighter, more practical bolstering of 
commitments toward Taiwan. 
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1. Extreme Doubling-Down Option 
Much like the accommodating strategy, the language contained in the key guiding 
documents are problematic. While the accommodating strategy finds fault in language 
focused on relations with Taiwan, the confrontational strategy instead emphasizes these 
same elements, seeking to bolster where possible. As such, adopting an extreme doubling-
down confrontational strategy would consist of five key tenets.  
First, because a literal interpretation of the three joint communiques appears 
undermining to a democratically independent Taiwan, the contents of these agreements 
should be completely deemphasized.219 Though the United States merely 
“acknowledges”220 the position of the Chinese in the Shanghai Communique, this 
acknowledgement has served to continue to embolden the Chinese position that Taiwan is 
a wayward province in need of reunification with the mainland.221 Similarly, though the 
United States “recognizes”222 the PRC as the sole legal government of China as jointly 
agreed in the Normalization Communique, this recognition, particularly when taken 
together with the acknowledgement statement of the Shanghai Communique, undermines 
the people and government in Taiwan.223 Though the 1982 Communique is not quite as 
detrimental to the Taiwan position as the other two communiques, the suggestion that 
“favorable conditions for the settlement of United States-China differences over the 
question of United States Arms sales to Taiwan,”224 is as equally untrue today as it was 
when originally written. Given the disparities in focus toward Taiwan, a confrontational 
                                                 
219 Bolton, “Revisit the ‘One-China Policy.’” 
220 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1975, Volume XVII, China 1969–1972, “Joint 
Statement Following Discussions with Leaders of the People’s Republic of China. Commonly Referred as 
the ‘Shanghai Communique.’” 
221 Buckley and Horton, “Xi Jinping Warns Taiwan That Unification Is the Goal and Force Is an 
Option.” 
222 “Joint Communique on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between the United States of 
America and the People’s Republic of China. Commonly Referred to as the ‘Normalization Communique.’” 
223 Bolton, “Revisit the ‘One-China Policy.’” 
224 Department of State, American Foreign Policy Current Documents 1982, 1038–39. 
65 
strategy requires a deemphasis of all three of these joint communiques. A denouncement 
or formal reinterpretation of these communiques would prove maddening to China in a 
way that is probably not in the national interest of the United States, but the foundational 
aspects that the communiques have had on all interactions with China would need to 
become much less instrumental.  
Second, along with deemphasizing the tenets of the three joint communiques, the 
United States should revert away from its One-China policy. Instead, the United States 
would formally adopt its de facto policy regarding China and Taiwan, something along the 
lines of one China, one Taiwan. Much like a formal denouncement of the communiques, 
this too would prove extremely maddening to the Chinese position to an extent that may 
provoke or accelerate conflict between China and Taiwan. 
Third, the TRA should become/remain the domineering policy emphasis toward the 
United States’ relations with Taiwan and China.225 This legislation favors the democratic 
will of the people of Taiwan through compelling the United States government to provide 
for or otherwise ensure that Taiwan can maintain a formidable defense against Chinese 
coercion.226 Emphasis toward Taiwan could be further bolstered through recognition of 
Taiwan as a de facto state,227 defining the United States’ intentions toward Taiwan in 
unambiguous terms,228 or even a formal recognition of Taiwan independence (should it be 
declared) as a way to keep the Chinese Communist Party off-balance.229 Shelly Rigger 
recently argued that adopting these stances would be overly provoking to China, and 
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therefore should be avoided.230 Much like the implementation tenets listed above, a revised 
TRA would likely garner an extreme amount of Chinese anger, thereby placing Taiwan in 
an increased amount of danger. For this reason, a formal adoption of a doubling down 
strategy would most likely simply seek to increase the emphasis that the TRA has towards 
United States relations with both China and Taiwan, rather than attempting to bolster 
beyond what the TRA already permits. 
Fourth, a doubling-down of commitments toward Taiwan would necessarily 
include an increase in the quality and quantity of arms sales to Taiwan.231 The TRA 
currently permits arms sales that are defensive in nature;232 rather than revise the TRA 
language to allow for the sale of offensive weapons, the vague differences in determination 
of what constitutes an offensive weapon from a defensive weapon would be leveraged to 
permit arms sales of increased capabilities.233 Much as the TRA directs the sale of weapons 
to Taiwan so long as Chinese military expenditures reflect offensive capabilities, the 
vagueness that differentiates offensive from defensive Chinese capabilities could pave the 
way for offensive arms sales to Taiwan. Increases in the quality and quantity of 
defensive/offensive weaponry would be agitating to China; however, they would likely be 
viewed as more palatable than the three implementational steps listed above. 
Fifth, John Bolton has advocated for the re-stationing of United States military 
personnel to Taiwan, suggesting that this would be permitted in the current legislation 
contained in the TRA.234 Though on the surface this argument may appear to be favorable 
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to Taiwan, the rationale of the argument is actually PRC focused:235 “Taiwan’s geographic 
location is closer to East Asia’s mainland and the South China Sea than either Okinawa or 
Guam, giving U.S. forces greater flexibility for rapid deployment throughout the region 
should the need arise.”236 Any decision to reposition the United States military to Taiwan 
would prove extremely maddening to China, and despite the rhetoric provided by Bolton, 
would not actually be advocated by most scholars and policy advocates in favor of 
doubling-down on commitments toward Taiwan. 
All five of these implementational steps would vehemently confront China in a 
struggle for great power competition, especially if taken in concert with one another. Most 
likely, they would not serve to improve the security of a democratic Taiwan, instead 
unnecessarily raising the stakes in ways that actually result in decreases in Taiwan’s 
security.  
2. Light Doubling-Down Option 
A potentially more practical policy adoption would address many of the same 
implementation steps noted above; however, it would seek to succeed in a way that is far 
less provocative. This light doubling-down policy option would consist of three key 
implementation tenets.  
First, the United States should avoid a public display of provocation in its attempts 
to deemphasize the three joint communiques. Along with this, the United States would 
need to maintain its One-China policy. These necessary concessions to China enable the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to maintain a domestic narrative that prevents an erosion 
of its legitimacy.237 Though these concessions are not ideal to the United States national 
interest, they are required to control the level of provocativeness that is inherent in the 
TRA.  
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Second, the TRA shall remain the primary emphasis of the United States’ relations 
with Taiwan. The legislation as originally crafted continues to receive near unanimous 
approval in both the House and Senate; though the proposed legislation contained in the 
Taiwan Assurances Act of 2019 seeks to bolster the United States commitments toward 
Taiwan, it is preponderantly a reaffirmation of the same commitments contained within the 
TRA.238 Rather than adopt a new piece of legislation that could be perceived as 
provocative, the Taiwan Assurances Act of 2019 should be removed from the legislative 
agenda. Instead, the United States should continue to adhere to the already existent law as 
written in the TRA. Congress can continue to reaffirm their commitments to the TRA 
through their annual vote to extend the measure.239  
Third, just like the extreme doubling-down option, the light option would also seek 
to bolster the quality and quantity of arms sales to Taiwan.240 Though arms sales to Taiwan 
have always been perceived as provocative by China, the United States shall continue to 
sell armaments to Taiwan that reflect the threat posed by China, as it is perceived by 
Taiwan. Importantly to the United States, this weaponry should be primarily defensive in 
nature, such as radar and sonar for detection, and anti-air and anti-ship missiles to deter 
attack. Other more offensively focused weapon systems sales of fighter jets and tanks shall 
only be permitted when a definitive defense use case is warranted. 
All three of these implementational steps would confront China in a struggle for 
great power competition but do so in a much less provocative way than discussed in the 
extreme policy option. In both cases, a confrontational strategy could prove advantageous 
(and disadvantageous if war provoking) to the positions of the United States and Taiwan, 
some of which will be explored next.  
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D. ADVANTAGES / DISADVANTAGES 
Adopting a confrontational strategy toward China that doubles-down on United 
States commitments offers quite compelling advantages, even if only some of the 
implementational steps listed above are adopted. However, key disadvantages to all the 
implementation steps are the provoking effects that they will undoubtedly have toward 
China. Though China may not be the behemoth superpower often characterized, its rise 
cannot be neglected altogether, and so careful attention to avoid overly provocative policies 
must be at the center of any policy altering decision. The following section will discuss 
three of the key advantages and disadvantages inherent to a confrontational policy that 
reinforces the current United States’ commitments toward Taiwan.  
1. Advantages 
First, United States’ efforts to bolster the military capabilities of Taiwan confront 
China on its primary territorial dispute.241 Though bolstered commitments might be 
advertised to the international community as being conducted to protect the thriving 
democracy of Taiwan, more importantly from a great power competition perspective, is 
the United States’ projection of strength and confidence in its position as the primary 
regional influencer.242 Recognizing that China has not achieved economic and military 
power parity with the United States, this projection of strength signals that the United States 
does not view China as a peer great power actor. To be sure, additional commitments 
toward Taiwan would be highly provocative and maddening to China; however, the lack 
of economic and military power parity nullifies the fears that China would significantly 
counteract.243 Much as Thucydides has taught that the “strong do what they can and the 
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weak suffer what they must,”244 the United States would in effect be telling China that it 
does not have the regional power necessary to overcome the regional influence of the 
United States. This advantage would become more apparent through an adoption of the 
extreme doubling-down policy option, though benefits are also achieved to a lesser extent 
through a lighter adoption. 
Second, by doubling-down on commitments toward Taiwan, the United States 
would signal its resolve to regional allies.245 In direct opposition to the loss of credibility 
that might occur with an abandonment strategy, actions to bolster Taiwan would further 
cement relationships between the United States and its regional alliances, restoring any 
residual doubt about the United States’ commitment to the Indo-Pacific region.246 
Continued and improved confidence in the hub and spoke alliance system throughout the 
Indo-Pacific region is imperative to preventing the proliferation of destructive arms races, 
in turn serving as a key facilitator of regional peace. This advantage would become more 
apparent through an adoption of the extreme doubling-down policy option, though benefits 
are also achieved to a lesser extent through a lighter adoption. 
Third, increasing commitments toward Taiwan would serve to protect its vibrant 
democracy that has served as a regional and global stalwart for the previous thirty years.247 
The increasing predominance of a unique identity in Taiwan248 that is starkly opposed to 
the authoritarian rule represented by the Chinese Communist Party continues to strengthen, 
evident most recently by the landslide reelection of President Tsai Ing-wen in January 
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2020.249 Through the strengthening of United States commitments toward Taiwan, the 
United States is better able to ensure that the future of Taiwan is determined by and has 
“the assent of the people of Taiwan.”250 By increasing commitments toward Taiwan, the 
United States is able to project the value that it places on democracy and the will of the 
people, both in Taiwan and globally. This advantage could be achieved through an adoption 
of either the extreme or light doubling-down policy option. 
2. Disadvantages 
First and foremost, implementing a policy that serves to reinforce the United States 
commitments to Taiwan will deeply anger China.251 Taiwan has been instrumental to the 
Chinese position, evident in each of the joint communiques, and it appears unlikely that 
China will reverse on this position in light of a bolstered Taiwan.252 If the 
implementational steps were taken in entirety (particularly a renouncing of the joint 
communiques; adopting a one China, one Taiwan policy; or re-stationing of United States’ 
military personnel in Taiwan), they would probably be deemed overly provocative and 
unacceptable to China. Even if the United States was successful in implementing this 
policy, the very act would also serve to increase the stakes, especially when considering 
that differences concerning the future of Taiwan represent one of the only flashpoints that 
could rapidly escalate to nuclear conflict between the United States and China.253 This 
disadvantage would be much more apparent through an adoption of the extreme doubling-
down option. A careful adoption of the light doubling-down strategy may avoid this 
disadvantage beyond what is currently present in the relations between the United States 
and China.  
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Second, China will increasingly feel that they are not respected on the world stage 
as a global power, thereby creating and deepening any resentment toward the current 
international order.254 Though certainly not amidst or even approaching the necessary 
parameters for a power transition, accounting for Chinese satisfaction remains paramount 
to future global peace.255 Until the time (if ever) that China exceeds economic and military 
power parity, this dissatisfaction will be exerted through increased defiance of United 
States’ desires in global institutions. Particularly, the United States will find it increasingly 
difficult to gain consensus among the five permanent members of the United Nations 
Security Council on important issues such as the denuclearization of North Korea and Iran. 
This disadvantage would be much more apparent through an adoption of the extreme 
doubling-down option. A careful adoption of the light doubling-down strategy may avoid 
this disadvantage beyond what is currently present in the relations between the United 
States and China.  
Third, a direct confrontation over the future of Taiwan, more so than any other 
dispute between the United States and China, could rapidly transform great power 
competition to great power conflict.256 A large part of the legitimizing narrative for the 
CCP is centered around righting the wrongs that were imposed upon China during its 
century of humiliation.257 To this point, a restoration of territories over which China 
perceives to have previously had sovereignty is an imperative, Taiwan being the premier 
example.258 If reunification becomes overly preclusive, the CCP may feel compelled to 
act in order to prevent a significant diminishment of its domestic legitimacy.259 In short, 
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the danger presented by adopting this policy option is due to an uncertainty of a response 
by the CCP, either because the future of Taiwan is in fact within the national interest of 
China as discussed in the first disadvantage, or because the CCP is in effect coerced to 
respond in attempts to maintain its domestic legitimacy.260 This disadvantage is possible 
if either the extreme or light doubling-down policy option is adopted, though is certainly 
more likely with an adoption of the extreme option.  
E. CONCLUSION 
The return to an era of great power competition, along with upholding democratic 
values throughout the globe, lead some scholars and policy experts to conclude that the 
United States must double-down on its efforts and commitments toward Taiwan. Though 
the argument to confront China in this regard, particularly in terms of protecting a vibrant 
democracy, have very persuasive and well-intentioned merits, the resulting risk and danger 
of adopting this type of policy is overwhelming. The CCP has not wavered from the 
propagandistic rhetoric that the reunification of Taiwan is one of its core interests, and as 
a result, this has since been a key contributor to the CCP’s narrative for legitimacy.261 For 
this reason, an adoption of this policy option would be overly provocative, thereby actually 
increasing the danger and risk for catastrophic conflict—a direct contradiction to the 
supporting arguments for an increase in commitments to Taiwan. As such, the necessity of 
adopting a strategy that doubles-down on United States’ commitments toward Taiwan 
appears unwarranted. Instead, the next chapter will present the argument that a 
maintenance of the status quo, despite pleasing none of the interested parties, remains in 
the long-term national interest of the United States (and China and Taiwan). 
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V. STATUS QUO: ANYTHING ELSE IS SIMPLY TOO 
UNPREDICTABLE AND DANGEROUS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Scholars and policy experts recommending a maintenance of the status quo 
generally draw this conclusion because adopting anything different is as unpredictable as 
it is potentially dangerous.262 The language contained in the three joint communiques has 
proved satisficing to China, while the seeming contradictions in the Six Assurances to 
Taiwan and Taiwan Relations Act have satisficed Taiwan.263 Similarly, China disapproves 
of the Six Assurances to Taiwan and the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA),264 while Taiwan is 
dissatisfied with the commitments contained in the three joint communiques.265 Despite 
the contradictions and displeasures, the resulting effects of deterrence and assurance for 
both China and Taiwan respectively, have effectively avoided sparking the most explosive 
flashpoint in East Asia.266 Through strategic ambiguity regarding United States’ 
preferences and involvement, a relative peace has been maintained even while the United 
States has established and maintained varying levels of relations with both China and 
Taiwan. Declaring definitive and resolute favor over one or the other would likely prove 
either too provoking or enticing for China, exponentially increasing the potential for 
catastrophic conflict that could quickly escalate to global conflict. For this reason, this 
thesis concludes that a maintenance of the status quo is the least-worst, and therefore only 
viable policy option that should guide United States relations with both China and Taiwan. 
An adoption of an abandonment or double down strategy is unnecessary, provocative, and 
much more likely to result in catastrophic conflict.  
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The purpose of this chapter will be to further analyze the status quo policy option 
in order to determine its relative persuasiveness and explanatory power to the other primary 
policy options. Through analysis, this chapter seeks to answer three primary research 
questions. First, why have supporting scholars and policy experts concluded that alternative 
policy options are too dangerous for consideration, and that the maintenance of the status 
quo is an imperative for the United States, China, and Taiwan? Second, what would be the 
key implementational tenets of this policy option if applied to the contemporary 
relationship between the United States and both China and Taiwan respectively? Third, 
what are the key advantages and disadvantages of adapting this policy option? 
To answer these research questions, this chapter will consist of three primary 
sections of analysis. The first section will analyze the necessity of the status quo as a way 
of prolonging the relative peace that has endured in East Asia. The second section will 
elaborate upon the key tenets and continued implementation requirements of a status quo 
strategy. The third section will list and analyze the key advantages and disadvantages of 
maintaining the status quo between relations among the United States and both China and 
Taiwan.  
B. ANALYSIS OF THE NECESSITY FOR THE STATUS QUO AS A MEANS 
OF PROLONGING THE RELATIVE PEACE 
The necessity of maintaining the status quo through continued adherence to the 
United States’ policies of One-China and strategic ambiguity becomes simply apparent 
after having analyzed the two other primary policy options in the previous chapters. 
Though far from ideal for the United States, China, and Taiwan, all other alternatives are 
impossibly dangerous.267 An accommodating strategy abandons the democratic ideals that 
have come to define the United States and the western world. A confrontational strategy 
that doubles-down on commitments toward Taiwan is overly provocative and will 
exponentially increase the pressure felt by the Chinese Communist Party to engage in 
aggressive acts. A change in policy may come to the initial delight of either China (abandon 
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Taiwan) or Taiwan (double-down on commitments), but Shelley Rigger contends that “it 
would create new problems just as intractable as the old ones, but less familiar and therefore 
potentially even more challenging.”268 In this way, the status quo represents the least bad 
option, even if equally and not explicitly, deterring and reassuring. However, the status quo 
is the only option that permits a continuation of the relative peace that exists among the 
United States, China, and Taiwan.  
C. IMPLEMENTATION OF A CONTINUED STATUS QUO STRATEGY 
Maintaining the status quo is much more than a continuance of previous policies 
that have come to define the United States’ One-China policy.269 This particularly rings 
true in light of the appearance of a policy shift being underway, evident by increased 
frequency of arms sales to Taiwan,270 deeper (though still necessarily shallow) diplomatic 
relations and engagements between the United States and Taiwan,271 coupled with the 
ongoing strain in relations between the United States and China. But the question begs 
whether these changes in relations serve the greater good and the longer-term national 
interest of the United States and the American people. This section will analyze the merit 
of recent changes in relations that the United States has had with Taiwan.  
First, United States’ arms sales to Taiwan have increased in terms of both quantity 
and quality during the Trump Administration, more so than during any other previous 
United States presidential administration.272 Arms sales approvals have become a much 
more normal, almost regular occurrence, whereas previous administrations had approved 
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such sales only periodically.273 Much as the quantity of approvals have increased, the types 
of weaponry approved for sale to Taiwan has increased in quality, further blurring the 
differences between what would be deemed offensive and/or defensive weaponry. The 
back-to-back arms sales approvals of July and August 2019 permitted the sale of M1A2T 
Abrams Tanks274 and F-16 Fighter Jets.275 Though these arms sales were approved under 
the auspice that they are defensive in nature, previous administrations had a high level of 
apprehension for similar type sales approval, explicitly because sales of tanks and fighter 
jets would prove particularly provocative to China, thereby having a potential destabilizing 
effect to the status quo. Contrary to the appearance given by frequent Trump 
Administration approvals, the potential for destabilization remains very high, and therefore 
arms sales such as tanks and fighter jets will need to be discontinued to avoid being overly 
provocative. Instead, arms sales approvals should be more definitively defensive in nature 
relative to the Chinese threat,276 namely radar and sonar for detection, and anti-air and 
anti-ship missiles to deter attack. Additionally, defensive arms sales approvals should be 
bundled so as to control the frequency of approvals. Bundled approvals would decrease the 
frequency, further limiting the provocation to China.  
Second, though diplomatic relations remain necessarily shallow between the United 
States and Taiwan, the Trump Administration has taken actions that might suggest a desire 
for deepening of relations. This desire appeared most evident upon Trump’s acceptance of 
a phone call from Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen.277 Arms sales of the type and frequency 
discussed above have led some to conclude an implicit endorsement of President Tsai Ing-
wen and the Democratic Progressive Party, particularly because the approvals occurred 
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during the run-up to the presidential election in Taiwan.278 Additionally, the Taiwan 
Travel Act of 2018 permits and encourages much higher-level diplomatic dialogue between 
the United States and Taiwan than had been previously allowed.279 Besides United States 
Congressional and State Department delegation visits to Taiwan,280 the provisions of the 
Taiwan Travel Act also permitted President Tsai Ing-wen to use New York City and 
Denver as in-transit layovers during her travels to the Caribbean.281 Furthermore, the 
House and Senate unanimously supported the Taiwan Allies International Protection and 
Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI) Act of 2019 before President Trump signed into law on 
March 26, 2020.282 The TAIPEI Act directs the United States government to “support 
Taiwan in strengthening its official diplomatic relationships as well as other partnerships 
with countries in the Indo-Pacific region and around the world.”283 Despite not yet having 
reached a point of criticality or Chinese response, the Taiwan Travel Act and the TAIPEI 
Act permit and encourages potentially overly provocative behavior. As such, extreme 
caution and apprehension shall be exercised in any additional actions that seek to deepen 
diplomatic ties between the United States and Taiwan, even if they are permitted and 
encouraged by United States law. 
Third, the Taiwan Assurances Act of 2019 was referred by the United States House 
of Representatives to the Senate in May of 2019.284 This proposed act was further referred 
to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, where it has remained dormant to date. 
Much more so than proposing an actual change to policy, the language instead seeks to 
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reaffirm the commitments made to Taiwan as contained in the Taiwan Relations Act and 
the Six Assurances to Taiwan.285 Though the proposed act and reaffirmation to Taiwan is 
arguably noble, one must ask whether the passage is of necessity, particularly considering 
a lack of decisively different language from that contained in the Taiwan Relations Act. 
Rather, the passage into law would instead serve as an unnecessary reminder to China that 
the United States continues to maintain commitments to Taiwan that contradict the 
commitments that the United States made to China as contained in the Third Joint 
Communique of 1982.286 As such, this Act is unnecessary and provocative, and so should 
be removed from the legislative agenda.  
Finally, and more generally, it is in the national interest of the United States to 
continue to promote a peaceful resolution toward the future of Taiwan. To this end, the 
United States shall adhere to Richard Bush’s dos and don’ts as contained in his “A One-
China Policy Primer.”287 Particularly, the United States should continue to reference “our 
One-China policy,” encourage a peaceful dispute resolution, continue defensive arms sales, 
and conduct bilateral engagements focused to strengthening deterrence.288 As importantly, 
the United States shall avoid overly provocative actions or steps, particularly those that 
present a domestic affront to the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party.289  
D. ADVANTAGES / DISADVANTAGES 
Maintaining the status quo that is enabled by an adherence to the United States’ 
One-China policy offers very compelling advantages, even if dissatisfying to the United 
States, China, and Taiwan. The following section will discuss three of the key advantages 
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and disadvantages inherent to a maintenance of the One-China policy and requisite 
strategic ambiguity.  
1. Advantages 
First and foremost, the primary advantage of achieving a maintenance of the status 
quo is that a relative peace would continue to persist across the Taiwan Strait.290 In fact, 
this relative peace has been maintained through the careful application of the United States’ 
policies of One-China and strategic ambiguity, dating back to the Shanghai Communique 
and continuing to this date. Despite each presidential administration having adopted more 
specific tweaks and interpretations to the language contained in each of the three joint 
communiques, the TRA, and the Six Assurances to Taiwan, the prevailing tenets of One-
China and strategic ambiguity have provided enough reassurance and deterrence to both 
China and Taiwan.291 Though the past policies are in no way guaranteed to prevail, the 
status quo is in fact the most predictable, least provocative, and safe avenue toward 
continued peace persisting between the United States and China over their respective 
international relations with Taiwan.292  
Second, the status quo keeps the United States directly within the dialogue for the 
future of Taiwan, even if the United States does not have the desire to be a formal arbiter 
of the final resolution. By maintaining this position, the United States is able to effectively 
protect the vibrant democracy in Taiwan, while deterring aggression from China.293 In this 
way, this position deters both China and Taiwan from unilateral attempts to alter the status 
quo, while also reassuring both China (even if not explicitly) and Taiwan that their 
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respective interests will be incorporated into any final resolution toward the future status 
of Taiwan.294  
Third, despite seemingly indecisive, the status quo actually permits many of the 
primary benefits advocated by scholars and policy experts for both the abandonment and 
doubling-down strategies, while preventing the drawbacks that might result from either of 
these policy adoptions. Without being war inducingly provocative, the United States is able 
to confront China through protecting the democracy in Taiwan,295 while also 
accommodating China through maintaining an ambiguous position toward the future of 
Taiwan.296 In fact, controlling the level of provocativeness is the most likely method for 
avoiding catastrophic confrontation.297 The lower provocation enabled by the status quo 
permits the Chinese Communist Party to spin the narrative that becomes necessary to 
maintain its legitimacy among the domestic Chinese population.298 Should the United 
States adopt the more enticing (to China) abandonment strategy, or the more provocative 
(again to China) doubling-down strategy, the Chinese Communist Party would likely 
experience very high levels of pressure to exert its mandate to regain lost territories 
resulting from its century of humiliation.  
2. Disadvantages 
First and foremost, though the status quo enables a relative peaceful coexistence, it 
also enables the persistence of one of the most potentially severe and dangerous military 
flashpoints.299 Though the issue of the future of Taiwan has been continually tabled by the 
leaders of the United States, China, and Taiwan, Chinese leaders regularly renew their 
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commitment to reunite Taiwan with the mainland, even if the cause requires a resort to 
military action.300 This constant core position of China is one that the Chinese Communist 
Party feels must be maintained, else risk a decisive loss of legitimacy.301 For this reason, 
China will not budge from its position, and therefore the potential for catastrophic conflict 
will persist far beyond the foreseeable future. 
Second, despite the relative peace enabled by the United States’ careful application 
of its One-China and strategic ambiguity policies, the status quo is dissatisfying to the 
United States, China, and Taiwan. This dissatisfaction is best represented by the differing 
arguments presented in this thesis, each seeking a more satisfying solution, albeit also 
coming at the utter expense of others. The United States has no desire to be in an arbiter 
position of the final resolution, hence the careful language in each of the joint 
communiques, the TRA, and the Six Assurances to Taiwan.302 Chinese displeasure is 
apparent by the continual renewal of its intent to reincorporate Taiwan303 to mainland rule 
and the need for the Chinese Communist Party to retain a high level of legitimacy among 
its domestic populace.304 The people of Taiwan, perhaps suffering the worst as a result of 
necessary ambiguity in this competition among great powers, are prohibited from fully 
exerting the self-determination that has enabled the democratic success of its regional 
neighbors.305 This across the board dissatisfaction is directly responsible for the differing 
policy debates among scholars and policy experts. 
Third, maintaining the status quo gives the appearance that the United States is 
indecisive, failing to take a stand one way or the other. This appearance enables pundits to 
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engage in powerful rhetoric that suggests that the United States’ failure to act is a mere 
kicking of the can down the road to a time at which China will have fully risen as a peer 
great power.306 Despite this appearance of indecisiveness, maintaining policies that enable 
the status quo, such as those of the previous near half century, are actually a decisive and 
deliberate position spanning every United States presidential administration, even if the 
specific application and interpretation has varied.307 
E. CONCLUSION 
Rigger, Bush, and the late Romberg have continually advocated for a maintenance 
of the status quo through meticulous adherence to the United States’ One-China policy and 
necessary resultant strategic ambiguity. More than a mere continuance of policies that have 
enabled a relative peace, the status quo is the only palatable option to the national interest 
of the United States, and most probably the only option that avoids catastrophic global 
conflict. For this reason, actions taken by the Trump Administration to increasingly arm 
Taiwan in terms of frequency and in a blurringly offensive nature, and a deepening of 
diplomatic relations between the United States and Taiwan, are especially eye watering, 
even if they appear noble on the surface. The status quo is not the best policy (there is 
none), but it is the least-worst among bad policy options.  
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The United States’ relations with both China and Taiwan have been guided by the 
three joint communiques, the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), and the Six Assurances to 
Taiwan.308 Collectively, these documents have come to define the United States’ One-
China policy, and the requisite strategic ambiguity that has enabled a relative peace. 
Despite the relative peace, the language in each of these documents was crafted during a 
very different geostrategic environment, one in which the dominant adversary of the United 
States was the Soviet Union. China, still reeling from the impacts of the Cultural 
Revolution, was a mere afterthought in terms of great power politics, though one that could 
be used as leverage against the Soviet Union.309 Since rapprochement, China has achieved 
the largest economic expansion in global history, which has enabled it to field a formidable 
military. The combination of an immensely increased level of economic and military 
power, along with a drastically differing set of political ideals, has brought upon a return 
to great power competition.  
The profoundly differing geostrategic environment calls into question whether the 
United States’ One-China and strategic ambiguity policies remain the best policy approach 
to China and Taiwan. Though the One-China policy has enabled a relative peace during 
the recent near half-century since Nixon’s rapprochement, the policy is quite dissatisfying 
to the United States, China, and Taiwan. For this reason, scholars and policy experts have 
engaged in debate regarding the policy approach that the United States should adopt toward 
its relations with China and Taiwan. This thesis has analyzed three of these primary 
arguments, namely accommodation through abandonment, confrontation through 
doubling-down, and a maintenance of the status quo.  
Former Ambassador Chas Freeman leads a prominent field of scholars, including 
Charles Glaser and Graham Allison, who suggest that the United States’ commitments 
toward Taiwan have a poisoning effect to the more important geostrategic relationship 
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between the United States and China. Taiwan armament efforts directly contradict the 
commitments that the United States had made to China in the Third Joint Communique of 
1982, further prolonging the future that may have been initially envisioned by Nixon and 
Mao during rapprochement. Though Freeman, Glaser, and Allison would rather Taiwan 
not be sacrificed, their realism based view of the power transition theory suggests that 
dominant existing powers must permit room for expansion of the rising power, else risk a 
struggle for regional hegemony based upon the rising power achieving or exceeding power 
parity.310 Analysis provided by this thesis concludes that despite the strong rhetoric of 
China having achieved peer status with the United States, China is not actually approaching 
economic and military power parity with the United States. Rather, the cumulative effects 
of long-term high levels of GDP and defense expenditures continue to place the United 
States in a category of its own, a condition that Michael Beckley contends will remain 
unrivaled very far into the foreseeable future.311 Given the disparate power parity 
differential between the United States and China, this thesis concludes that an abandonment 
of commitments toward Taiwan is unnecessary, even if continued commitments toward 
Taiwan prove maddening to China. Beyond being unnecessarily warranted and premature, 
an adoption of an abandonment strategy would have direct implications toward the United 
States’ ability to maintain credibility in its alliances with states throughout the Indo-Pacific 
region. 
Former Ambassador and National Security Advisor John Bolton, Bonnie Glaser, 
and the late Nancy Bernkopf Tucker have argued that the United States should confront 
the aspiring China, namely in China’s efforts to undermine the vibrant democracy in 
Taiwan. The TRA and the Six Assurances to Taiwan better reflect the ideals of not only 
the United States, but also the western world, and so these documents should take 
precedence in any relationship that the United States has with both China and Taiwan. To 
this end, Bolton, Glaser, and Tucker argue that the United States should increase its efforts 
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to arm and protect the democratic Taiwan. Though less explicit, the Trump Administration 
has adopted policies that seem to favor Taiwan, namely more frequent and offensively 
capable military arms sales agreements312 and deeper diplomatic engagement through 
passage into law of the Taiwan Travel Act313 and the Taiwan Allies International 
Protection and Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI) Act of 2019.314 More explicitly, 
President Trump, as of this writing, has caused deep consternation among all advocates of 
the One-China policy through his acceptance of a congratulatory phone call from Taiwan 
President Tsai Ing-wen.315 Even if this was simply a diplomatic gaffe that contains no 
further meaning, it quickly brought into question the continued viability of the One-China 
policy under the newly ascended Trump Administration. Through analysis of this policy 
option, this thesis concludes that each of the necessary steps to adopt a formal policy that 
favors Taiwan will be extremely provocative and maddening to China. Furthermore, the 
lack of economic and military parity between the United States and China, along with 
Taiwan’s already formidable ability to defend against Chinese attack as professed by 
Michael Beckley,316 renders this policy option unnecessary, even if many of the tenets 
appear to uphold and promote the exemplary democratic Taiwan.  
The final policy option analyzed throughout this thesis recommends a maintenance 
of the status quo in international relations that the United States has with China and Taiwan. 
Shelley Rigger, Richard Bush, and the late Alan Romberg advocate that the United States’ 
strict and meticulous adherence to its One-China policy has not only maintained a relative 
peace throughout the previous near half-century, but also is the only policy option that will 
maintain this relative peace in the future. Though far from ideal, the status quo is the only 
policy option that is congruent with the long-term national interest of the United States 
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(and consequently, China and Taiwan). For these reasons, Richard Bush became deeply 
alarmed by Trump’s acceptance of Tsai’s congratulatory phone call,317 and further so by 
President Trump’s reticent walk back of this position, informing Chinese President Xi 
Jinping that the United States would “honor our ‘one China’ policy.”318 Much like the 
conclusion drawn by Rigger, Bush, and Romberg, this thesis concludes that the 
maintenance of the status quo is the least bad of other worse options. Despite the 
appearance of indecisiveness, a decision by the United States to adhere by its One-China 
policy and the requisite strategic ambiguity is rather a deliberate and decisive attempt to 
promote and maintain the relative peace that has persisted among the United States, China, 
and Taiwan.  
Given this conclusion, the appearance of a shift in policy toward Taiwan by the 
Trump Administration becomes even more alarming. First, the more frequent and offensive 
quality of recent arms sales authorization to Taiwan most probably exceeds the necessity, 
given Taiwan’s already formidable defense capabilities, especially considering the 
geography of Taiwan is far favorable to the defender against power projection. As such, 
this thesis would characterize the increase in frequency and quality of arms sales as a 
confrontation to China through a doubling down of commitments toward Taiwan. Second, 
the Taiwan Allies International Protection Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI) Act clearly 
states its favorability toward Taiwan, demonstrated through the encouragement of the 
international community to increase diplomatic ties with Taiwan, to include the inclusion 
of Taiwan in international organizations that it is currently prohibited from participation. 
Though the TAIPEI Act appears perfectly reasonable on the surface, it indirectly 
contradicts the tenets of the United States’ One-China policy, and therefore this thesis 
would characterize the TAIPEI Act as a confrontation to China through a doubling down 
of commitments toward Taiwan. Finally, the much higher level of diplomatic exchanges 
enabled by the Taiwan Travel Act also serve to confront China through a doubling-down 
of commitments toward China. 
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Instead, the Trump Administration and Congressional leadership would be wise to 
work within the constraints of the legislation and joint agreements that have defined the 
United States’ One-China policy for the better part of the recent half-century. First, 
continual reaffirmation that the United States has an enduring interest in the peaceful 
resolution of the future status of Taiwan that fully accounts for the will of the democratic 
people of Taiwan.319  Second, future arms sales agreements should be less frequent, threat-
based, and more definitively defensive in nature.320  Threat-based defensive weaponry that 
would increase the already formidable defensive perimeter enabled by the geography of 
Taiwan shall be the primary basis for consideration. Finally, the United States should 
continue to support efforts by Taiwan to maintain its few remaining diplomatic ties, 
however, do so in a way to is not overtly provocative to China in a way that may undermine 
its ability to maintain domestic legitimacy.321  By carefully treading the middle ground 
between a full implementation of either abandonment or confrontation, the United States 
will be best postured to maintain the relative peace in a way that is more unlikely to ignite 
the spark to catastrophic conflict.  
The United States’ policies of One-China and strategic ambiguity have served the 
national interest for a near half-century and continue to be the most viable path toward 
ensuring a relative peace among the United States, China, and Taiwan. Even as China 
continues its unprecedented economic and military expansion, the impasse between the 
United States and China regarding the future status of Taiwan also continues to widen. A 
final resolution appears exceedingly out of reach, barring a catastrophic global conflict that 
could easily escalate beyond conventional arms. Though the status quo is far from 
satisfying for the United States, China, and Taiwan, the shared distribution of 
dissatisfaction has had, and will continue to have the greatest potential for stability across 
the Taiwan Strait. Put simply, any alternative is impossibly dangerous.  
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